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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on sovereign risk and banking.
In the first essay, we examine the determinants of sovereign risk in the Eurozone focusing on
the recent crisis episode and search for a self-fulfilling contagion link by using an exogenous
ECB policy announcement for identification. Our principal components analysis reveals that
the perceived commonality in default risk among peripheral and core Eurozone countries in-
creased after the announcement. An event study detects significant pre-announcement news
transmission from Spain to Italy, Belgium, France and Austria that clearly dissipates post-
announcement. Country-specific regressions of CDS spreads on systematic risk factors illustrate
frequent days of large adverse shocks affecting simultaneously those same Eurozone countries
during the pre-announcement period; but not afterwards. Altogether these findings support
the view that market expectations during Eurozone crisis were at least partially self-fulfilling
and ECB policy helped to contain such adverse dynamics.
In the second essay, we focus on European banks’ sovereign bond exposures. By using a
novel bank-level dataset covering the entire timeline of the Eurozone crisis, we first re-confirm
that the crisis led to the reallocation of sovereign debt from foreign to domestic banks. This
reallocation was only visible for banks as opposed to other domestic private agents and it
cannot be explained by the banks’ risk-shifting tendency. In contrast to the recent literature
focusing only on sovereign debt, we show that banks’ private sector exposures were (at least)
equally affected by a rise in home bias. Finally, we propose a new debt reallocation channel
based on informational frictions and show that crisis-country debt was not only reallocated to
domestic banks, but also to the informationally closer foreign banks. Our results imply that
informational asymmetries among banks played a key role in the recent fragmentation across
Eurozone debt markets.
In the third essay, our investigation shifts towards political economy aspects of the relationship
between sovereigns and domestic banks. We use data on the universe of credit extended over a
14-year period in Turkey to document a strong political lending cycle. We find that state-owned
banks systematically adjust their provincial lending around local elections relative to the private
banks in the same province. There is considerable tactical redistribution: state-owned banks
increase loans in politically competitive provinces with a current mayor aligned with the ruling
party but reduce it in similar provinces with a current mayor from opposition. This effect only
exists in corporate lending as opposed to consumer loans, suggesting that tactical redistribution
targets job creation to increase electoral success. Such political lending also seems to influence
real outcomes as the credit-constrained opposition areas suffer a drop in economic output as
measured by local construction activity.
i
ii
Acknowledgements
Essays included in this thesis have been presented at various occasions and I have benefited
from fruitful discussions with many colleagues. In particular:
• For the first essay titled ‘ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right?’, I
am grateful to Thorsten Beck, Paul De Grauwe, Jose´-Luis Peydro´, Christian Wagner, an
anonymous referee at Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and two anonymous
referees at Journal of International Money and Finance for their useful comments and
suggestions. I also thank participants at the Rimini Conference in Economics and Finance
(June, 2014), Young Finance Scholars’ Conference and Quantitative Finance Workshop
at the University of Sussex (May 2014), and seminar participants at Brunel University,
Cass Business School and Keele University.
• For the second essay titled ‘Domestic banks as lightning rods? Home bias during Eu-
rozone crisis’, I am grateful to Ramon Adalid, Koray Alper, Thorsten Beck, C¸ag˘atay
Bircan, Paul De Grauwe (discussant), Hans Degryse, Ralph De Haas, Ana-Maria Fuertes,
Mikael Homanen, Sanja Jakovljevic (discussant), Elena Kalotychou, Alexandros Kon-
tonikas, Angela Maddaloni, Krzysztof Makarski (discussant), Ian Marsh, Alberto Mart´ın,
Phu Nguyen-Van (discussant), S. Mehmet O¨zsoy, Ugo Panizza and Richard Payne for
their useful comments and suggestions. I also thank seminar participants at Bank of
England, Cass Business School, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, DIW Berlin,
European Central Bank, London School of Economics, O¨zyeg˘in University, Sabancı Uni-
versity, University of Bonn, University of Essex, Augustin Cournot Doctoral Days (Uni-
versity of Strasbourg), Barcelona GSE 2017 Summer Forum, Belgian Financial Research
Forum (National Bank of Belgium), Conference on Challenges for Financial Stability in
Europe (Czech National Bank), Global Debt Dynamics Initiative Inaugural Workshop
(University of Sussex), IFABS 2016 Barcelona Conference, Money Macro Finance PhD
Workshop (University of Birmingham), Young Finance Scholars Conference (University
of Sussex). Part of this research was completed while I was visiting the Central Bank of
the Republic of Turkey, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.
• For the third essay titled ‘Political Lending Cycles and Real Outcomes: Evidence from
Turkey’, I am grateful to seminar participants at Cass Business School and European
iii
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Part of this research was completed
while I was visiting EBRD, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.
I would also like to express my gratitude to many people who have showed their support
throughout this journey and encouraged me in times of despair. I would like to thank especially
to:
• my PhD supervisors: Ana-Maria Fuertes and Elena Kalotychou for giving me the chance
to work with them and always having faith in me ...
• PhD office: including Ian Marsh, Giovanni Cespa, Malla Pratt, Abdul Momin and Eeron
Bovell for their guidance and assistance in every step of the way ...
• all my PhD colleagues at Cass: specifically, Andre´ Silva, Cristiano Bellavitis, Go¨kmen
Durmus¸, Jonathan Jona, Mikael Homanen, Munir Hiabu, Mustafa Kavas and Tanvir Nabi
Khan for all the nerdy chats and coffee sessions with scientific flavour ...
• my lifelong friends: Ahmet Avs¸ar, Ali Balcı, Emin Kavlak and Hu¨seyin Gu¨ls¸en for making
my PhD life more bearable with their presence ...
• my family: Fevzi, Birsen and Og˘uz Saka for their infinite love and care ...
• and lastly to Evelyn Lien for being there for me in the right time at the right place.
iv
“Hayat kısa,
Kus¸lar uc¸uyor.”
Cemal Su¨reya
v
vi
Contents
Abstract i
Acknowledgements iii
1 Introduction 1
2 ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right? 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Data Description and Preliminary Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1 Sovereign CDS spreads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.2 Commonality in credit risks of Eurozone sovereigns . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1 Spain-news transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.2 Herding effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.3 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
vii
CONTENTS
3 Domestic banks as lightning rods? Home bias during Eurozone crisis 53
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 The Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.1 Recent home bias in the Eurozone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.2 Home bias in other markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4 Methodology & Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4.1 Sovereign home bias during crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4.2 Risk-shifting in crisis-country banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4.3 Bank vs. non-bank domestic creditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4.4 Sovereign vs. private debt home bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4.5 Effect of informational distance on banks’ sovereign exposures . . . . . . 71
3.4.6 Further analysis and policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4 Political Lending Cycles and Real Outcomes: Evidence from Turkey 104
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.2.1 The Turkish banking sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.2.2 Politics and local elections in Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.4 Methodology & Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.4.1 Identification strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
viii
4.4.2 Is there an election cycle in state-bank credit? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.4.3 Is there tactical redistribution across provinces? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.4.4 How does political lending affect economic outcomes? . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5 Conclusion 146
Bibliography 148
ix
x
List of Tables
2.1 Descriptive statistics for daily sovereign CDS spreads of European countries . . . 35
2.2 Pooled OLS regressions of quarterly CDS spreads on fundamentals . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 Principal component decomposition of daily Eurozone CDS spreads . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Spain-specific daily news . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5 Spain-specific news effects on Eurozone sovereign CDS spreads . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6 Spain-specific news effects on non-Eurozone sovereign CDS spreads . . . . . . . 42
2.7 Spanish-specific news effects over 6-month windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.A1 Breakpoint test for changes in the level of the first two principal components
derived from daily Eurozone CDS spreads over the two-year observation window
around the implicit OMT announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.A2 Test for significance of differences in news transmission before and after the
implicit OMT announcement (daily CDS spreads) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.A3 Test for significance of structural break in mean level of herding index (daily
CDS spreads) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.A4 Spain news transmission to daily Eurozone CDS spreads before and after the
formal OMT announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.A5 Spain news identification based on daily CDS spreads using alternative bench-
marks (CAPM versus APT) and estimation methods (full sample versus sequen-
tial rolling-window estimation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
xi
LIST OF TABLES
2.A6 Principal component decomposition of daily Eurozone bond yield spreads . . . . 49
2.A7 Breakpoint test for changes in the level of principal components derived from
daily Eurozone bond yield spreads over the two-year observation window around
the implicit OMT announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.A8 Test for significance of differences in mean level of herding index pre- and post-
implicit OMT announcement (daily bond yield spreads) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.A9 Test for significance of within-Eurozone contagion proxied by the second principal
component of daily Eurozone CDS spreads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.1 Data disclosure details from European Banking Authority (EBA) . . . . . . . . 87
3.2 Summary statistics for main variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3 Sovereign debt reallocation across European banks during crisis . . . . . . . . . 89
3.4 Sovereign debt reallocation across European banks during crisis: Stressed Banks 90
3.5 Sovereign debt reallocation during crisis: Resident banks vs non-bank residents . 91
3.6 Debt reallocation across European banks during crisis: Sovereign vs retail debt . 92
3.7 Sovereign debt reallocation across European banks during crisis: Effect of infor-
mational distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.8 Effect of informational distance: Controlling for risk-shifting . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.9 Effect of informational distance: Controlling for risk-shifting and Eurozone share 95
3.10 Effect of informational distance: Controlling for risk-shifting and German banks 96
3.A1 Debt reallocation across European banks during crisis: Sovereign vs corporate
debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.A2 Main results with only Eurozone banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.A3 Main results with only Eurozone banks and without Greek exposures . . . . . . 99
3.A4 Main results with the crisis threshold of 300 basis points . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
xii
3.A5 Main results with the crisis threshold of 500 basis points . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.A6 Main results with the crisis dummy replaced with bond spreads . . . . . . . . . 102
3.A7 Main results with the crisis dummy replaced with CDS spreads . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.1 Composition and performance of Turkish banking sector over time . . . . . . . . 137
4.2 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.3 State-bank behaviour in election years: Yearly estimates (2003-2016) . . . . . . 139
4.4 State-bank behaviour in election years: Quarterly estimates (2007q4-2016q4) . . 140
4.5 Tactical reallocation in metropolitan provinces: Yearly estimates (2003-2016) . . 141
4.6 Tactical reallocation in metropolitan provinces: Quarterly estimates (2007q4-
2016q4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.7 Political competition, alliance, and local economic activity (2003-2016) . . . . . 143
4.A1 Growth in Turkish banking sector (1999-2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.A2 State-bank behaviour in election years: Election combinations . . . . . . . . . . 145
xiii
xiv
List of Figures
2.1 Daily sovereign CDS spreads from December 5, 2008 to July 25, 2013 . . . . . . 23
2.2 Scatterplots and OLS regression line for Eurozone CDS spreads versus macro
fundamentals from mid-2011 to mid-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 First and second principal components of daily Eurozone CDS spreads . . . . . 25
2.4 Herding contagion index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.A1 Evolution of macroeconomic fundamentals over the two-year observation window
around the implicit OMT announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.A2 CAPM-based herding indices for ‘good news’ around the implicit OMT an-
nouncement (daily CDS spreads) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.A3 APT-based herding indices for ‘bad news’ around the implicit OMT announce-
ment (daily CDS spreads) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.A4 First and second principal components of daily Eurozone CDS spreads over the
two-year observation window around the formal OMT announcement . . . . . . 30
2.A5 CAPM-based herding indices for ‘bad news’ around the formal OMT announce-
ment (daily CDS spreads) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.A6 CAPM-based herding indices for ‘bad news’ around the implicit OMT announce-
ment using rolling windows (daily CDS spreads) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.A7 First and second principal components of daily Eurozone bond yield spreads over
the two-year observation window around the implicit OMT announcement . . . 33
xv
2.A8 CAPM-based herding indices for bad news around the implicit OMT announce-
ment (daily bond yield spreads) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1 Home bias in core and periphery Euro countries during crisis . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2 Home bias (CAPM-adjusted) in core and periphery Euro countries during crisis 83
3.3 Home bias for bank residents, non-bank residents and non-residents during crisis 84
3.4 Bank branch network across European countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.5 Bank merger network across European countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.1 District-level alliances in two non-metropolitan provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.2 Evolution of aggregate credit by bank type, 2003-2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.3 State vs private bank behaviour over the full election cycle: Yearly estimates
(2003-2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.4 State vs private bank behaviour over the full election cycle: Quarterly estimates
(2007q4-2016q4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.5 Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the full election cycle: Yearly
estimates (2003-2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.6 Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the full election cycle: Quarterly
estimates (2007q4-2016q4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.7 Corporate vs consumer loans: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over
the full election cycle (2007q4-2016q4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.8 Effect of competition and alliance on local economic activity (2003-2016) . . . . 136
xvi
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this PhD thesis, I investigate three topics at the intersection of sovereign risk and banking.
The first one (Chapter 2) is a joint work with my PhD supervisors (Ana-Maria Fuertes and
Elena Kalotychou) and focuses on the contagion links observed among European governments’
CDS (and bond) spreads during Eurozone crises. While most of the literature attributes such
contagion or transmission of shocks to fundamental channels that operate across countries (such
as banking, trade or investment linkages), there is also a recent stream of studies that interpret
the clustering of large common shocks as a sign of market panic or self-fulfilling dynamics that
do not have much to do with individual countries’ macroeconomic fundamentals. However,
in the absence of a comparable control group of countries that do not have any fundamental
linkages among each other, it is difficult to empirically differentiate between these two different
channels of contagion.
We attempt to overcome this obstacle by using an exogenous policy change of the European
Central Bank (ECB) in which it expressed its willingness to start acting as a lender of last
resort (LOLR) in government debt markets for illiquid but solvent Eurozone states. There
are good reasons in the theoretical literature to assume that countries of a common currency
would be especially prone to self-fulfilling market dynamics as their central banks would lose
the ability to print money and could not step into the market in times of high illiquidity. In
such an environment, negative market expectations might validate themselves by increasing the
1
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interest rates on government bonds, making it costlier to roll-over maturing debt and eventually
incentivising the government to default rather than refinance itself at those high rates. The key
to our identification is the theoretical assertion that if such dynamics were at play, then ECB’s
LOLR position should help to contain them. However, such a policy change would not have
an effect if the cross-country transmission of shocks were mainly due to fundamental channels.
Therefore, this policy experiment gives us a clear empirical strategy in which we focus on two
short (one-year) time periods around the announcement date to minimize the effect of any
changes other than the policy itself.
Our findings are: (i) principal components analysis reveals that the perceived commonality in
default risk among peripheral and core Eurozone countries increased after the announcement.
In the meantime, the link between country fundamentals and spreads strengthened implying
that there might be non-fundamental factors at play prior to the announcement. (ii) An event
study detects significant pre-announcement news transmission from Spain to Italy, Belgium,
France and Austria that clearly dissipates post-announcement. This is consistent with the view
that news in one country could act as a trigger (sunspot) for self-fulfilling market movements
against other countries. (iii) Country-specific regressions of CDS spreads on systematic risk
factors illustrate frequent days of large adverse shocks affecting simultaneously those same
Eurozone countries during the pre-announcement period; but not afterwards. Altogether these
findings support the view that market expectations during Eurozone crisis were at least partially
self-fulfilling and ECB policy helped to contain such adverse dynamics.
In Chapter 3, I focus on European banks’ sovereign bond exposures and investigate the main
drivers of their evolution throughout the Eurozone crisis from early 2010 to mid-2015. Recent
literature points to an interesting observation: European banks started increasing the amount
of domestic government debt in their balance sheets as their governments were struck by the
sovereign debt crisis. Though it may come across as puzzling at first, existing literature already
provides various explanations. For instance, it could be the case that these banks were (morally)
pressured by their governments who were in need of urgent liquidity to roll-over their debt
payments. Moreover, most of those banks located in crisis countries were undercapitalised,
which may have led them to bet on their own government bonds to shift the risk onto their
2
creditors in case of default. Also, it is possible that these banks may have anticipated that
their governments would be less willing to default on domestic creditors and thus absorbed the
bond sales of foreign banks in the secondary markets.
By using a novel bank-level dataset compiled from various stress-tests, transparency and capital
exercises of the European Banking Authority (EBA), I reach several interesting results: (i) I
first re-confirm that the crisis led to the reallocation of sovereign debt from foreign to domestic
banks. (ii) However, this reallocation was only visible for banks as opposed to other domestic
private agents, which does not seem to be consistent with the secondary market or exchange
rate channel of the rising home bias. (iii) I find weak evidence for risk-shifting tendency of
the troubled country banks; nonetheless this does not come close to explaining the full extent
of the preference for local government bonds. (iv) In contrast to the recent literature focusing
only on sovereign debt, I also show that banks’ private sector exposures were (at least) equally
affected by a rise in home bias, which implies that the specific channel of moral suasion on
sovereign debt has limited explanatory power in sample.
Given the insufficiency of the existing explanations, I propose a new debt reallocation channel
based on informational frictions and (v) show that crisis-country debt was not only reallocated
to domestic banks, but also to the informationally closer foreign banks. I further confirm that
this effect is independent of the previous channels proposed in the literature, robust to various
sample recompositions and exists more generally rather than being specific to the periods of
extreme sovereign stress. Hence, these results imply that informational asymmetries among
banks played a key role in the recent fragmentation across Eurozone debt markets.
In Chapter 4, which is a joint work with C¸ag˘atay Bircan, we take a political economy ap-
proach to study the relationship between sovereigns and banking sector. Specifically, we explore
whether ruling parties in central government use bank lending in order to advance their own
private agendas. We use data on the universe of bank loans extended over a 14-year period in
Turkey to confirm that this is indeed the case. Differently from previous literature, we exploit
a newly-available quarterly database to pin down the exact timing of electoral credit misal-
location. Same database also gives us the chance to test whether governments would target
3
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corporate or consumer lending for re-election purposes. Finally, in order to check the effect of
credit on local economic outcomes, we benefit from a novel database on private construction
activity at the province-level.
For identification, we exploit three layers of differences. First, state-owned banks would be more
susceptible to government pressure and thus we compare them with private banks. Second,
political pressure on banks would be stronger prior to elections and thus we exploit the time
dimension in our data and compare near-election periods with non-election periods. Third,
government’s targeting of bank loans would rather focus on politically attractive regions where
the marginal benefit of an additional vote would be higher, which gives us a cross-sectional
dimension to compare provinces with high levels of electoral competition with the ones where
elections are not heavily contested.
Our findings are two-fold: (i) We find that state-owned banks systematically adjust their
provincial lending around local elections relative to the private banks in the same province.
There is considerable tactical redistribution: state-owned banks increase loans in politically
competitive provinces with a current mayor aligned with the ruling party but reduce it in
similar provinces with a current mayor from opposition. Besides, rolling estimations in non-
election years show some evidence that central government may have resorted to patronage
when it did not have election concerns. (ii) Political cycle only exists in corporate lending
as opposed to consumer loans, suggesting that tactical redistribution targets job creation to
increase electoral success. In line with this conjecture, real local outcomes seem to be influenced
by the political cycle as the credit-constrained opposition areas suffer a drop in economic output
measured by local construction activity.
4
Chapter 2
ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility:
Was De Grauwe Right?
“You have large parts of the euro area in what we call a ‘bad equilibrium’, namely an equilibrium
where you may have self-fulfilling expectations that feed upon themselves and generate very
adverse scenarios.”
(ECB President Mario Draghi; 6th September 2012)
2.1 Introduction
Since 2009, when the debt problems of Greece came to light, the suddenness and magnitude
of changes in Eurozone bond yield spreads have sparked a debate among economists regarding
the likely causes. The fundamentalist viewpoint is that the surge in Eurozone yield spreads
is purely a reflection of deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals. The multiple-equilibria
view contends that markets may not always function optimally and thus, without any major
change in fiscal fundamentals, the decisions of panic-driven investors may lead a country to a
5
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self-fulfilling liquidity crisis that otherwise would not have occurred.
The idea that sovereign members of a currency union are more vulnerable to investor sentiment
is encapsulated in the “Eurozone fragility hypothesis” (De Grauwe, 2012; 2013). The hypothesis
states that, by issuing debt in a currency that they cannot control, member states are susceptible
to a self-fulfilling dynamics fuelled by market sentiment. Panic and fear about a sovereign’s
defaulting on its debt obligations is likely to trigger sudden stops in capital inflows and hence,
higher interest rates. The latter make it harder for the sovereign to roll over its short-term
debt, creating a perverse feedback effect between market sentiment and interest rates that could
trigger a liquidity crisis and ultimately, the feared default.
This self-fulfilling dynamics is unlikely to happen in debt markets of sovereigns that retain
control of their currencies because investors recognize the presence of a central bank that,
acting as lender-of-last-resort (LOLR), will inject the necessary liquidity in crisis. The fragility
hypothesis thus sums the idea that such a self-fulfilling dynamics would not be present in
Eurozone debt markets if the European Central Bank (ECB) takes the LOLR role. This paper
provides empirical tests of the Eurozone fragility hypothesis from different angles.
Mario Draghi announced on July 26, 2012 that the ECB was prepared within its mandate to do
“whatever it takes” to preserve the euro. Draghi’s announcement gained more meaning a few
days later on August 2, 2012 when the ECB Governing council declared its intention to under-
take outright open market operations in secondary government bond markets.1 On September
6, 2012, the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program was formally launched, under
which the ECB would act as LOLR for countries backed by the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). Through this program, the ECB can make purchases or outright transactions in the
secondary sovereign bond markets of member countries to ease liquidity pressures. Condition-
ality (strict fiscal supervision) is attached to avoid moral hazard and bond purchases are fully
sterilized to prevent inflationary pressures. Furthermore, the OMT program is only activated
for a country if, by unanimity among ESM members, its debt is deemed sustainable (Wolff,
2014).
1See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120802.en.html
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The main goal of this paper is to investigate whether the important change in the ECB’s policy
stance (signalled by the OMT program) has effectively curbed the self-fulfilling dynamics in
Eurozone debt markets. Our line of argument builds upon the fact that the OMT is neither
a form of fiscal distribution among Eurozone members nor a bailout plan. Even if markets
had initially misinterpreted the speech as a ‘promise’ for solvency support, the conditionality
attached as part of the requirements of the OMT program rules this out. We examine the
sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) of 14 countries in Europe as representative of the credit
risk of ‘periphery’ versus ‘core’ Eurozone countries, as well as European countries that have
not adopted the euro. This can shed light on the way markets have discriminated in terms of
sovereign risk pricing between these three groups of countries. We provide convincing evidence
that the Eurozone debt markets began to anticipate the LOLR role of the central bank (that
materialized in the OMT program) following Draghi’s “whatever-it-takes” pledge on July 26,
2012; hence, we focus on this implicit OMT announcement date for most of our analysis and
conduct sensitivity analysis later on.
An eclectic methodology is deployed to test De Grauwe’s Eurozone fragility hypothesis. A
principal component analysis of daily Eurozone CDS spreads reveals a ‘structural break’ in
Eurozone sovereign risk perceptions on the (implicit OMT) announcement date. The first
and second principal components suggest that the announcement increases the commonality
in sovereign risks of periphery and core Eurozone countries, and marks a change in the way
markets discriminate among Eurozone members towards a more fundamental-based approach.
Both a news transmission analysis and a herding contagion analysis conducted at the daily
frequency produce evidence suggesting that pessimistic self-fulfilling dynamics has been at play
in Eurozone debt markets; the implicit OMT announcement significantly lessens this contagion
channel. The news transmission study suggests that the Eurozone contagion triggered by news
from Spain to Italy, Belgium, France and Austria is only present prior to the announcement.
The herding contagion analysis reveals frequent occurrences of simultaneous adverse shocks to
the CDS spreads precisely of those same countries that were identified as exhibiting significant
news contagion effects but again only pre-announcement.
The findings support De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis and the underlying multiple-equilibria
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theory of the crisis. The latter does not overlook the importance of fundamentals but adds
that, in times of massive economic adjustment, panic amplifies exogenous shocks and can push
an otherwise solvent country toward default. Our findings suggest that there is more to the
recent Eurozone debt crisis than a strong link between credit spreads and fundamentals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section outlines the relevant background
literature. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. The empirical results are presented
in section 4. Section 5 discusses various policy implications and concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
Our paper is motivated by theoretical multiple-equilibria models that predict that fundamentals
matter to the extent that countries with sound and weak fundamentals would incur a single
outcome, default or no default, respectively, while multiple equilibria can happen for countries
with similar fundamentals that lie in between these two poles (Calvo, 1988; De Grauwe, 2012;
Gros, 2012; Corsetti & Dedola, 2016). Thus, the multiple-equilibria theory does not preclude
increased sensitivity to fundamentals such as fiscal space and public debt ratios in the run-up
to the Eurozone debt crisis but rather it contends that they are not the whole story (Aizenman,
Hutchison, & Jinjarak, 2013; De Grauwe & Ji, 2013). It is well known that peripheral Eurozone
countries suffered dramatic rises in their CDS spreads (during the pre-OMT period) compared
with non-euro European countries with similar fundamentals; clearly, this leaves a role for
self-fulfilling dynamics in the absence of a lender-of-last-resort.
Our paper relates to a burgeoning literature on the recent European sovereign debt crisis that
provides evidence on ‘contagion’ broadly construed (with many nuances) as cross-country link-
ages driven by market expectations that are somewhat divorced from fundamentals. Beirne
& Fratzscher (2013) document herding contagion or cross-country clustering of adverse shocks
that cannot be traced to fundamentals. Likewise, De Grauwe & Ji (2013) show that a substan-
tial part of the simultaneous rise in credit spreads of Eurozone countries was driven by market
sentiment of panic and fear. Aizenman et al. (2013) show that Eurozone periphery default risk
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was overpriced in 2010 relative to that of non-euro ‘matched’ countries (i.e., similar countries
in terms of fiscal space) and provide as one of two alternative explanations that the mispricing
was due to a wave of contagious pessimism or a “bad” self-fulfilling expectational equilibrium.
Alter & Beyer (2014) provide evidence of cross-country links in CDS spreads after controlling
for exogenous common factors, while De Santis (2014) find contagion from Greece to other
Eurozone member countries.
A parallel literature argues that investors became more sensitive to fundamentals during the
crisis, a phenomenon that has been often formalized as “wake up calls” or fundamental con-
tagion (Caceres, Segoviano Basurto, & Guzzo, 2010; Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; Beirne &
Fratzscher, 2013; Manasse & Zavalloni, 2013; Mink & De Haan, 2013). In a similar vein, an
alternative more fundamentals-based explanation provided in Aizenman et al. (2013) for their
findings is that the CDS market prices the risk of default not only on current but also future
fundamentals which were expected to worsen for Eurozone periphery countries due to the ad-
justment challenges faced given their exchange rate and monetary constraints. Our paper adds
to these studies by comparing the dynamics of Eurozone debt markets over two short length
(12-month) windows that differ in an incontestable fact while members of the common currency
faced similar fiscal problems, exchange rate and monetary constraints in both windows, only
in the post-OMT announcement window the ECB assumed the LOLR role. This important
change in the ECB policy stance ought to restrain the dramatic rises in credit spreads in the
region only if these had a significant self-fulfilling dynamics component (De Grauwe, 2013).
Finally, our research is related to a stream of the literature that tests the effects of uncon-
ventional ECB policies on the market-priced risks of sovereign debt. For instance, De Pooter,
Martin, & Pruitt (2013) find significant stock and flow effects on sovereign bonds’ liquidity risk
resulting from ECB bond purchases under the Security Markets Program (SMP). Similarly,
Eser & Schwaab (2013) show that the SMP program had a long-lasting impact on the sovereign
bond yields of periphery Eurozone countries. Likewise, Ghysels, Idier, Manganelli, & Vergote
(2014) conclude that the SMP was effective in reducing both the level and volatility of bond
yield spreads. Some recent studies found similarly depressing effects in the context of the OMT
programme (Lucas, Schwaab, & Zhang, 2014; Falagiarda & Reitz, 2015; Altavilla, Giannone,
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& Lenza, 2016a).
2.3 Data Description and Preliminary Analysis
2.3.1 Sovereign CDS spreads
The analysis is based on daily midpoint closing spread quotes on 5-year sovereign credit de-
fault swap (CDS) contracts from January 1, 2008 to July 25, 2013 from Datastream. The
CDS contracts pertain to four Eurozone ‘periphery’ countries (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain), six Eurozone ‘core’ countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the
Netherlands), and four European countries that are not members of the euro currency union
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden and UK). Following the literature, recent Eurozone members (such
as Latvia) and other economically small countries (such as Estonia, Slovakia, Malta and Slove-
nia) are excluded from the periphery (see, for instance, Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; Beirne
& Fratzscher, 2013; Beetsma, Giuliodori, De Jong, & Widijanto, 2013; De Grauwe & Ji, 2013;
2014; De Santis, 2014). We conjecture that the exclusion of Greece, due to lack of CDS data
from March 2012, is immaterial given that the systemic importance of Greece lessens notably
in the most recent years (Alter & Beyer, 2014; Gonza´lez-Hermosillo & Johnson, 2017). This
conjecture is later substantiated through a sensitivity analysis using bond yield data.
CDS prices are arguably more informative than bond yields for various reasons. Firstly,
sovereign CDS data are more liquid and allow more accurate and timely estimates of credit
risks (see, e.g., Ang & Longstaff, 2013 and Aizenman et al., 2013). In addition, CDS spreads
are recognized as a more direct measure of default risk than bond yield spreads as they are not
affected by differences in contractual arrangements, contract-specific liquidity effects, inflation
expectations and demand/supply for credit conditions; see, e.g., Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, &
Singleton (2011) and Aizenman et al. (2013). Nevertheless, as noted above, we employ bond
yield spreads as another proxy for sovereign risk in various robustness checks.
The evolution of daily CDS spreads in Figure 2.1 shows that an upward trend of pessimism in
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peripheral Eurozone credit risk erupts around March 2010 when Greece was first rescued. A
marked downward trend in CDS spreads is observed after July 26, 2012 when Mario Draghi
stated that the ECB was prepared to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro. This is the
main event in our study (referred to as the implicit OMT announcement) because although the
actual announcement of the OMT program took place barely a month later, it has been argued
that Draghi’s pledge effectively signalled the new stance of the ECB as LOLR in Eurozone
sovereign debt markets (Pisani-Ferry, 2013).
Table 2.1 summarises the distribution of CDS premiums in basis points over the 12-month win-
dow preceding the (implicit OMT) announcement, Panel A, and the 12-month post-announcement
window, Panel B; the last column shows the change in CDS spreads. The level and volatility
of CDS spreads notably rise during the pre-announcement period; Ireland and Portugal are
plausible exceptions since they both received bailout packages earlier on.2 The CDS spreads of
all countries exhibit an overall decrease in the post-announcement window.
As part of our preliminary data analysis, we regress the CDS spreads on macroeconomic fun-
damentals using quarterly data pooled across the 10 Eurozone countries. Our focus is on four
key ratios often used in studies of the Eurozone debt crisis: Debt/GDP which measures the
country’s government debt relative to GDP (Caceres et al., 2010; Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012;
Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013; De Grauwe & Ji, 2013; 2014), Budget/GDP or the relative govern-
ment budget balance (Caceres et al., 2010; Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; Beirne & Fratzscher,
2013; De Santis, 2014), Debt/Tax or ‘fiscal space’ defined as government debt relative to tax
base averaged over the previous five years to account for business cycle fluctuations (Aizenman
et al., 2013; De Grauwe & Ji, 2013), and Current Account/GDP or current account balance
cumulated from 2009:Q4 divided by the GDP level (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013; De Grauwe
& Ji, 2013; 2014). Figure 2.2 shows scatter-plots and corresponding regression lines pre- and
post-announcement which clearly reveal various outliers defined as the country-quarter CDS
spreads that were most misaligned with fundamentals.
The outliers thus identified pertain to the Eurozone periphery (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
2Ireland and Portugal were bailed out on November 22, 2010 and May 16, 2011, respectively.
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Spain) and are only observed in the pre-announcement period. In the lower panel of Figure 2.2,
excluding Portugal and Ireland (under the premise that their bailouts may have diluted the link
of their CDS spreads with fundamentals), the outliers pertain to Spain and Italy. The pooled
OLS regression results in Table 2.2 further confirm that fundamentals played a significant
role as drivers of CDS spreads in both periods but their explanatory power is stronger post-
announcement. These findings constitute evidence that the implicit OMT announcement may
have helped the Eurozone debt markets to coordinate on a more fundamental-based equilibrium.
We further investigate this conjecture in the next sections.
2.3.2 Commonality in credit risks of Eurozone sovereigns
We conduct a principal component analysis of daily CDS spreads over the two-year sample pe-
riod around the implicit OMT announcement. Following Longstaff et al. (2011) and Arghyrou
& Kontonikas (2012), we interpret the first two principal components (hereafter, PC1 and PC2)
as common risk factors. PC1 represents a Eurozone sovereign risk factor broadly defined as an
equal-weighted average of country CDS spreads; thus, the loadings capture the systemic contri-
bution of each sovereign. PC2 represents the divergence among core and periphery countries;
a negative (positive) loading indicates a core (periphery) country. This divergence amounts to
the risk differential from investing in periphery versus core bonds which Arghyrou & Kontonikas
(2012) link with the notion of ‘contagion’ through a default domino effect and the increased
probability of aggregating fiscal risks.
As Table 2.3 shows, in the pre-announcement window the two components PC1 and PC2 explain
together about 75% of the total variation in Eurozone CDS spreads, and the explanatory power
of PC2 is 20%. Post-announcement, the two factors capture 96% of the total variation, and
the contribution of PC2 falls to 5%. However, this increased commonality across Eurozone
spreads cannot be attributed to a convergence trend among these countries’ fundamentals in
the post-announcement window since such a trend did not occur (see Figure 2.A1). A better
interpretation is that there were additional unobserved risk factors (i.e., self-fulfilling dynamics)
in the region which the announcement served to contain.
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The contribution of Ireland and Portugal to Eurozone credit risk in the pre-announcement
period is small as suggested by respective PC1 loadings of 0.097 and 0.020. This result aligns
well with our previous finding (Table 2.1) that Ireland and Portugal are the only two Eurozone
countries that experienced an overall pre-announcement decline in CDS spreads as a result of
earlier EU/IMF bailout programs which altered investors’ risk perceptions. A similar conclusion
is reached by Alter & Beyer (2014) albeit from a different methodology. The loadings of PC2 also
provide interesting reading. Before the announcement, markets clearly discriminated against
countries such as Spain and Italy but perceived Portugal and Ireland more favourably. Post-
OMT announcement, the positive loadings of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland indicate that
investors classify them together again alongside Belgium and France.
The dynamics of the two principal components in Figure 2.3 informally suggests a ‘break’ at the
implicit OMT announcement date on July 26, 2012 which is confirmed by formal tests; thus,
investors begin by then to anticipate the LOLR stance symbolized by the OMT program soon
after.3 PC1 and PC2 exhibit distinct behaviour pre- and post-announcement. PC1 swings
wildly around a high plateau pre-announcement and stabilizes at a much lower level post-
announcement. This further suggests that the announcement serves to restrain overreaction
and mispricing of Eurozone credit risks. PC2 exhibits a steep upward trend in the first half of
2012, echoing investors’ perception of growing divergence (‘periphery’ versus ‘core’) in Eurozone
credit risk. The OMT announcement marks the beginning of a reversal.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Spain-news transmission
In this section we conduct an event study to assess the impact of news specific to a “trou-
bled” Eurozone country on other Eurozone member countries and on non-euro (or stand-alone)
3More formally, the Chow breakpoint test reveals a significant change in the conditional mean (level) of PC1
and PC2 on the day of the implicit OMT announcement (July 26, 2012); however, the evidence of a break on
September 6, 2012 is relatively weaker as the test only suggests a break in the mean level of PC1 but not of
PC2. Detailed results are tabulated in Table 2.A1.
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European countries; a similar approach has been adopted in extant studies of contagion such
as Mink & De Haan (2013). The first task then is to choose a periphery country as the main
contagion source over the entire sample period under study from July 26, 2011 to July 25, 2013.
Greece, Portugal and Ireland are ruled out since they received rescue packages at earlier stages
and hence, lost their capacity to generate contagion later on (Alter & Beyer, 2014; Gonza´lez-
Hermosillo & Johnson, 2017). Spain is a good candidate since it experiences the peak of its
debt problems during the sample period (its CDS spreads peaked 2 days before the implicit
OMT announcement) and the Eurozone core versus periphery contagion factor (PC2) loadings
reveal that Spain is perceived as the riskiest country before the announcement.
In order to construct a Spain-specific news variable (Newst,Spain), a key input in the event-study
analysis, we identify the days of most salient events through the OLS regression:
∆CDSSpain,t − rf,t = α + β(∆Europeant − rf,t) + uSpain,t (2.1)
where ∆CDSSpain,t denotes the daily change in the Spanish CDS spread, ∆Europeant is the
daily change in a European sovereign risk index constructed as an average of the CDS spreads
of the remaining 9 Eurozone countries and 4 non-euro European countries in the sample, and
rf,t is the ECB’s daily Euro Over Night Index Average (EONIA) rate from Datastream. We
estimate the model, which can be broadly perceived as a CAPM benchmark, separately over
the pre- and post- announcement windows using the OLS method and examine the residuals.4
We identify the 10 days in each window (pre- and post-OMT announcement) that show the
largest (absolute) residuals |uSpain,t| and relate those days to news from Reuters and Bloomberg
Businessweek that may have caused the unexpected CDS change. This residual approach
mitigates the possibility of ‘event contamination’ by market-wide (i.e., Eurozone) shocks since
it identifies the Spain-specific event dates as days when the actual change in the Spanish CDS
premium deviates substantially from the expected (CAPM-based) change.
Table 2.4 shows the 10 most salient Spain-specific events thus identified in each window and
4Innovations to Spanish CDS spreads might influence other countries’ spreads but it is unlikely that they
can drive the entire European index; thus, endogeneity does not represent a serious concern here.
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associated news; the symbols R (Reuters) and B (Bloomberg) indicate the news source. Building
upon the semi-strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis, we assume that a large residual
on any day reflects news arriving on that day; that is, the CDS premium quickly incorporates
all public information. Of course, the Reuters or Bloomberg Businessweek news may not always
represent the actual underlying causes of significant market movements. Yet it provides a good
approximation of what the average or representative investor might think about the important
events of each day and about their potential effects on debt markets (Mink & De Haan, 2013).
The discrete Spanish-news variable is constructed as NewsSpain,t = dt∗ ûSpain,t where dt is equal
to 1 on the salient news dates and 0 elsewhere.
Next we estimate by OLS the following CAPM type model to measure the news contagion:
∆CDSi,t − rf,t = β(∆Europeant − rf,t) + α0 + α1NewsSpain,t + εi,t (2.2)
where ∆CDSi,t is the daily change in the Eurozone country ith CDS spread, and εi,t is an
innovation; ∆Europeant and rf,t are as defined after Equation 2.1. The parameter of interest,
α1, captures the responsiveness of CDS spread changes in country i to news specific to the
Spanish economy (contagion from Spain); αt = α0 + α1Newst is a time-varying abnormal
return that captures the model’s mispricing; the European risk factor loading, β, measures the
sensitivity of the ith country CDS premium to the European CDS premium. Table 2.5 shows
the estimation results over the pre- and post-OMT announcement windows.5
In the pre-OMT announcement window, the Spanish-news impact is positive for Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Italy and the Netherlands although insignificant so for the latter. The strongest
Spanish-news impact is found for Italy, in line with extant evidence of co-movements of Spanish
and Italian debt spreads (e.g., Gonza´lez-Hermosillo & Johnson, 2017). These results suggest
that pre-announcement, investors’ perception of the creditworthiness of other Eurozone coun-
tries is tainted by Spanish news. This evidence is consistent with our early findings from the
5Inspired by Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2012), we estimate the country-specific CAPM Equation 2.2 without
the Spain-news variable but expanded with PC2 as a proxy for contagion within the Eurozone. For none of
the countries the PC2 coefficient is significant post-OMT. The only contagion effect pre-OMT is revealed for
Spain (a significantly positive coefficient at the 1% level) which confirms the role played by this country as
contagion-source; see Table 2.A9.
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principal component analysis. In contrast, the Spanish-news coefficient for Portugal and Ireland
is negative which confirms that the epicentre of the crisis had moved away from them, namely,
investors’ perception had shifted favourably towards countries that had applied strict austerity
measures relative to the new ‘strugglers’ that were resisting those actions. Post-announcement,
no significantly positive Spanish-news coefficient is obtained and thus, there is no news trans-
mission from the troubled Spanish sovereign bond market to any other Eurozone bond market.6
How do we explain the significant lessening in the Spanish news contagion effects before and
after the implicit OMT announcement?
Under the premise that the ECB “whatever-it-takes” pledge was most credibly interpreted
by investors as a hint of the bank’s intention to act as LOLR (not as some form of fiscal
redistribution or a bailout plan), our explanation is that there was self-fulfilling dynamics in
the region. If the news transmission had been purely a wake-up call (i.e., news about Spain
prompting investors to closely pay attention to other countries’ fundamentals) then one would
not expect the OMT to have such calming down effect on the news transmission.
CDS spreads of Eurozone member countries respond to (generally) adverse Spain-specific news
but not necessarily because of the information content about their own current or future fun-
damentals; if this was the reason then the effect ought to have been present both pre- and
post-announcement. The news transmission occurred most likely because, in the absence of a
LOLR, investors’ panic and fear channelled the markets toward a ‘bad’ equilibrium. Moreover,
the finding of insignificant Spanish-news transmission for stand-alone countries (e.g., Denmark
and UK, as shown in Table 2.6) further strengthens the evidence in favour of the Eurozone
fragility hypothesis as it proves that the phenomenon was specific to members of the currency
union. In the next section, we test the fragility hypothesis from a different angle.
6We assess the significance of the news impact differential (H0 : α1
pre = α1
post vs HA : α1
pre > α1
post)
with an F test statistic. To do so, we estimate the CAPM benchmark Equation 2.2 including the two dummy
variables NewspreSpain,t and News
post
Spain,t (pre- and post-announcement Spanish news, respectively) as regressors.
The null is strongly rejected at the 1% significance level, as shown in Table 2.A2, for Austria, Belgium, France
and Italy.
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2.4.2 Herding effects
Following Beirne & Fratzscher (2013) and De Grauwe & Ji (2013) among others, our analysis
of herding effects builds upon the notion that a simultaneous rise in sovereign CDS premiums
that cannot be explained by common risk factors represents a “debt run” against the particular
group of countries. Such phenomenon is commonly interpreted as reflecting contagion through
unobservables such as herding due to investor sentiments of panic and fear.
We analyse the clustering of large unexplained changes in the pricing of sovereign risk (i.e.,
herding effect) through OLS estimation of the following CAPM type equation:
∆CDSi,t − rf,t = α + β(∆Europeant − rf,t) + εi,t (2.3)
using daily data over the two-year sample period around the implicit OMT announcement; the
estimation is carried out per country i=1,...,N (N =14) which produces N distributions of daily
residuals, εi,t, t=1,...,T (T =523 residuals). Our focus is on the right-tail of the distribution,
that is, the most extreme positive residuals (i.e., unexpected CDS spread changes above those
explained by the European risk factor) defined using the 20th or 10th percentile rule. The
herding contagion index is conservatively defined on each day of the sample period as the
proportion of countries with extreme positive residuals if this proportion exceeds 80% (i.e.
clustering of extreme bad news) and zero otherwise.
Based on our findings from the principal components decomposition of CDS spreads and the
Spain-news transmission analysis, the sample countries are allocated to three groups; a ‘conta-
gion’ set comprising Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and Spain; a ‘non-contagion’ set comprising
Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal; and a non-euro set (or control group)
with Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK. According to De Grauwe’s Eurozone fragility hy-
pothesis, the market perception of creditworthiness of these stand-alone countries cannot be
tainted by self-fulfilling dynamics precisely because they retain sovereign control over their own
currencies; namely, they have a superior force of last resort (their central bank) that prevents
investors from precipitating a liquidity crisis (De Grauwe, 2013). Figure 2.4 shows the daily
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herding contagion indices for all three groups of countries.
As for the ‘contagion’ group, we identify a large number of days with simultaneous large un-
expected changes in the pricing of sovereign risk preceding the implicit OMT announcement.
However, even with the lenient 20th percentile rule, only three such clusters are identified
post-announcement, and two of them occur on the days immediately before the formal OMT
announcement on September 6, 2012 so they would not have qualified as post-announcement
herding days had the formal OMT announcement been adopted as threshold to define the
windows. The strict 10th percentile rule produces similar findings. In contrast, for the ‘non-
contagion’ set and the non-euro set, we identify less than a handful of days with herding in
both the pre- and post-announcement windows.
A formal Chow type test suggests that the mean level of the daily herding index for the
‘contagion’ Eurozone set is significantly higher (at the 1% level) in the pre-announcement
window than post-announcement; detailed results are shown in Table 2.A3. Thus, herding
(or fear-driven) contagion aﬄicted several Eurozone debt markets before, but not after, the
implicit OMT announcement; these findings, in conjunction with our previous analysis, endorse
De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis.7
2.4.3 Robustness checks
This section discusses additional estimations and tests. We begin by adopting a pricing equation
which is more in the spirit of the arbitrage pricing theory (Ross, 1976; APT). This is the route
taken also by empirical studies that employ market indices as proxies for unobserved sources of
commonality among sovereigns (e.g., Manasse & Zavalloni, 2013; Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher,
7Our focus is on the unexpected movements in sovereign CDS spreads that are driven by ‘bad’ news (the
right-tail of the residual distribution) because De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis in the context of the recent
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis goes hand-in-hand with market sentiments of panic and fear (De Grauwe, 2012;
2013). However, more generally, self-fulfilling dynamics applies in both directions; the multiple-equilibria theory
rationalizes both contagious pessimism and contagious optimism. In a robustness check we construct herding
contagion indices pertaining to good news (left-tail of residuals) as shown in Figure 2.A2; the results confirm
our main findings.
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& Mehl, 2014). Accordingly, we estimate the following pricing equation with daily data:
∆CDSSpain,t − rf,t = α + β1(∆Europeant − rf,t) + β2(∆Financialt − rf,t)
+ β3(∆Globalt − rf,t) + uSpain,t (2.4)
where the betas (β1, β2, β3) measure the sensitivity of the country’s spreads to three common
risk factors: one for European sovereigns, a second for financial intermediaries, and a third
one for global sovereigns. Europeant is as defined after Equation 2.1, Financialt is the Markit
iTraxx Senior Financials index based on the 25 most liquid CDS reference entities for senior
debt issued by European financial firms, and Globalt is an equally-weighted average of CDS
spreads of the same 26 (non-European) sovereigns as in Longstaff et al. (2011) that proxies
global sovereign credit risk. The data are sourced from Datastream.
As in the preceding analysis (reported in Section 2.4.1) we estimate the pricing model, sepa-
rately, over the one-year windows before and after the implicit OMT announcement, in order to
identify salient Spain-specific news dates. Once those event dates are identified we re-construct
the discrete Spain news variable NewsSpain,t and estimate the contagion model:
∆CDSi,t − rf,t = β1(∆Europeant − rf,t) + β2(∆Financialt − rf,t)
+ β3(∆Globalt − rf,t) + α0 + α1NewsSpain,t + εi,t (2.5)
where the relevant coefficient that captures contagion from Spain is α1. The estimation results
in Table 2.5 show a significantly positive news coefficient for Italy, Belgium, as with the CAPM,
but also for France and Austria providing somewhat stronger evidence of news transmission from
Spain to these two countries. The difference in the pre- and post-announcement news coefficients
of these countries (H0 : α1
pre−α1post = 0) is strongly significant according to an F test statistic;
detailed results are provided in Table 2.A2. Likewise, the herding contagion indexes derived
from the APT benchmark with three common risk factors, instead of Equation 2.3, did not
challenge our previous findings; the results are reported in Figure 2.A3.
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In another robustness check we compare shorter (6-month as opposed to 12-month) windows
around the implicit OMT announcement. The pre-announcement period is from January 26,
2012 to July 25, 2012, and the post-announcement period from July 27, 2012 to January 25,
2013. These shorter windows allow less room for changes in fundamental channels of cross-
country credit risk transmission such as trade or financial links and hence, permit us to assess
in a more ‘sterilized’ manner the impact of the implicit OMT announcement. We focus now
on the 5 most salient event dates (instead of 10) in each period owing to the shorter periods.
The results summarized in Table 2.7 confirm that the contagion from Spain news to the CDS
premiums of other Eurozone countries (e.g., Italy and Belgium) unambiguously loses significance
after the implicit OMT announcement.
Next we re-deploy the different approaches (principal components, Spain-news transmission and
herding effects) by adopting as “announcement date” the day of the formal OMT announcement
on September 6, 2012. The results summarized in Figures 2.A4 and 2.A5, and Table 2.A4 do
not change our main findings.
Furthermore, we generalize the Spain-news transmission and herding contagion analysis to a
setting that allows for time variation in the common risk factor loadings (the beta coefficients in
the benchmark). Thus, we estimate by OLS the CAPM and APT pricing equations sequentially
over rolling estimation windows. The event indicator NewsSpain,t is obtained as follows; the
residual for day t is obtained as the difference between the actual CDS change on that day
and the expected CDS change for that day according to the pricing model estimated over the
corresponding rolling window (spanning a one-year period of 261 days). The window is then
rolled forward one day to obtain the residual for day t+1 and so forth. The results from this
analysis make no material difference to the news identification; in fact, about 90% of the dates
thus detected are listed in Table 2.4. It is also reassuring to see that the evidence of herding
contagion does not materially change when we sequentially estimate the CAPM benchmark
over rolling windows. Detailed results are provided in Table 2.A5 (Spain-news identification)
and Figure 2.A6 (herding effects).
In a final robustness check we analyse bond yield spreads defined, as it is usual, with reference
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to Germany. Detailed results are provided in Appendix figures and tables; Figure 2.A7 and
Tables 2.A6-2.A7 summarize the principal components analysis. Figure 2.A8 and Table 2.A8
show, respectively, the herding contagion indices and F tests for the significance of the change
in herding pre- and post-announcement. These analyses include Greece as periphery Eurozone
country. The findings are robust to using different measures of sovereign credit risk and confirm
that the earlier exclusion of Greece from the sample period due to lack of CDS spreads data is
immaterial.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
The turmoil in Eurozone debt markets that erupted more than five years ago revived an old de-
bate. Fundamental theorists blame periphery countries’ deteriorating fundamentals. However,
without denying the role of fundamentals, multiple-equilibria theorists argue that a self-fulfilling
dynamics fuelled by market sentiments of fear and panic has been at play in the region pushing
countries towards a worse equilibrium than is justified by fundamentals alone.
In the spirit of the multiple-equilibria discourse, De Grauwe (2013) articulates the Eurozone
fragility hypothesis which states that countries that have adopted the euro are prone to sudden
reversals in capital flows triggered by market sentiment of fear which can ultimately trigger
the feared default. This self-fulfilling dynamics is unlikely to occur in the US, UK or Japan
because the financial markets know that these countries have a central bank acting as lender-
of-last resort (LOLR). Absent the latter, the Eurozone member countries are in essence like
“emerging countries” issuing debt in a foreign currency; thus, their credit risk spreads can be
subject to self-fulfilling dynamics that misaligns them with fundamentals.
ECB President Mario Draghi announces on July 26, 2012 that the ECB is prepared within its
mandate to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro; a month later, the ECB introduces
the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program that represents the lender-of-last resort
stance. In response to German Eurosceptics’ protests against the legality of the OMT program,
the German Constitutional Court on February 2014 passes the case to the European Court of
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Justice. Our paper contributes to making an informed judgement on this matter.
It provides empirical evidence that supports De Grauwe’s Eurozone fragility hypothesis by show-
ing, through an eclectic methodology subject to various robustness checks, that the sovereign
debt crisis aﬄicting many Eurozone countries should be ascribed to more than fundamentals.
A principal component analysis of Eurozone CDS spreads suggests that their commonality
increases post-announcement. The link between Eurozone fundamentals and CDS spreads is
found to increase post-announcement. The transmission of news about Spain and herding
contagion significantly lessen after the announcement.
These findings suggest that a self-fulfilling dynamics was present in Eurozone debt markets and
Draghi’s implicit OMT announcement served to contain it. This policy stance of the ECB has
helped not only ‘periphery’ members (such as Italy and Spain) but also ‘core’ members (such
as Belgium and France) that are struggling to restore their economies to their pre-crisis state,
even as their southern neighbours face the risk of deflation and stagnation.
In suggesting that fundamentals are not the whole story, our findings challenge the ‘you-deserve-
what-you-get’ attitude of advocates of strict austerity programs. Our findings stress the in-
stitutional role that the ECB plays in preventing debt runs in the region. A positive (albeit
not sufficient) step in addressing the Eurozone structural fragility is the unanimous political
backing by its members of the ECB’s role as a lender of last resort. However, further structural
reforms at supranational level such as a fiscal union possibly with centralized taxation and
redistribution power are also crucial to fully overcome such fragility.
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(a) Peripheral Eurozone countries
(b) Core Eurozone countries
(c) Stand-alone European countries
Figure 2.1: Daily sovereign CDS spreads from December 5, 2008 to July 25, 2013.
The graphs show the daily evolution of the CDS spreads (in basis points) of 10 Eurozone
countries distinguished as ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’, and four non-euro European countries. The
first vertical line on March 31, 2010 marks the date of the first rescue package for Greece. The
second vertical line on July 26, 2012 marks the date of ECB President Mario Draghi’s statement
that the Bank was prepared to do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro”; this paper refers
to this date as the implicit Outright Monetary Transactions program (OMT) announcement.
The third vertical line marks the formal OMT announcement on September 6, 2012.
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Figure 2.3: First and second principal components of daily Eurozone CDS spreads.
The first and second principal components plotted are extracted from the correlation matrix of
daily CDS spreads over the two-year sample period around the implicit OMT announcement
(on July 26, 2012; vertical dashed line) that commences on July 26, 2011 and ends on July 25,
2013. The CDS spreads pertain to 10 Eurozone countries, of which 4 are ‘peripheral’ countries
(Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and 6 are ‘core’ countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany and the Netherlands) according to the standard classification.
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Figure 2.A4: First and second principal components of daily Eurozone CDS spreads
over the two-year observation window around the formal OMT announcement. The
figure plots the first and second principal components of daily CDS spreads for 10 Eurozone
countries. The vertical continuous line marks the formal OMT announcement date on Septem-
ber 6, 2012. The vertical dotted line marks the implicit announcement date on July 26, 2012.
The principal components are extracted from the correlation matrix of daily Eurozone CDS
spreads for 4 peripheral countries (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and 6 core countries
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands).
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Figure 2.A7: First and second principal components of daily Eurozone bond yield
spreads over the two-year observation window around the implicit OMT announce-
ment. The figure plots the first and second principal components of daily bond yield spreads
for 10 Eurozone countries defined with reference to Germany. The vertical dotted line marks
the implicit OMT announcement date on July 26, 2012. The vertical continuous line marks
the formal announcement date on September 6, 2012. The principal components are extracted
from the correlation matrix of daily bond yield spreads for 5 Eurozone peripheral countries
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and 5 core countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France and the Netherlands) countries.
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Table 2.2: Pooled OLS regressions of quarterly CDS spreads on fundamentals. The
table reports the OLS slope coefficient estimates of regressions of CDS spreads on four macro
indicators in the one-year windows before and after the implicit OMT announcement on July
26, 2012. The estimation is based on pooled quarterly data for 10 Eurozone countries. Auto-
correlation and heteroskedasticity robust Newey-West t-statistics are reported. ** and * denote
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Principal component decomposition of daily Eurozone CDS spreads. The
table reports eigenvalues λj, j = 1, ..., 10 and the proportion of the total variation in CDS
spreads of 10 Eurozone countries that is explained by each principal component given by
λj/
∑
λj. The last two columns report the eigenvectors or country loadings to construct the
first and second principal components (denoted PC1 and PC2, respectively). The principal
components are extracted from the correlation matrix of daily sovereign CDS spreads over
the two-year sample period around the implicit OMT announcement (on July 26, 2012). The
principal components are summarized, separately, over the two yearly windows surrounding
the implicit OMT announcement. The 10 Eurozone countries are 4 ‘peripheral’ (Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain) and 6 ‘core’ (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Nether-
lands) according to the standard classification.
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Table 2.7: Spanish-specific news effects over 6-month windows. The table repeats
the analysis of Spain-specific news based on news identification over shorter 6-month windows
around the implicit OMT announcement. In each window only the five days of most salient
news are considered in the construction of Newst,Spain. The table reports the OLS estimate
of the coefficient of the Spanish-news variable (α1) in the CAPM Equation 2.2 which controls
only for European sovereign risk, and the APT Equation 2.5 that additionally controls for
global sovereign risk and European financial risk. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust
Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** and * denote significant coefficients
at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
43
Chapter 2. ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right?
Table 2.A1: Breakpoint test for changes in the level of the first two principal com-
ponents derived from daily Eurozone CDS spreads over the two-year observation
window around the implicit OMT announcement. The table reports the Chow test
(Chow, G., 1960; Econometrica, 28, 591-501) and Bai and Perron test (Bai, J. & P. Perron,
2003; Econometrics Journal, 16, 1-22) applied to the first two principal components, PC1 and
PC2, of the daily CDS spreads of 10 Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) from July 26, 2011 to July 25,
2013. The null hypothesis of the Chow test is no change and the alternative is that a change
occurred at a specific date (either the implicit OMT announcement date on July 26, 2012 or
the formal OMT announcement date on September 6, 2012). The Bai-Perron test allows for
multiple unknown breakpoints. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respec-
tively.
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Table 2.A2: Test for significance of differences in news transmission before and after
the implicit OMT announcement (daily CDS spreads). The table reports estimation
results for the CAPM benchmark Equation 2.2 in Panel A and the APT benchmark Equation 2.5
in Panel B using as news variables Newspret,Spain = dt · ûpret,Spain and Newspostt,Spain = dt · ûpostt,Spain where
dt is equal to 1 on the salient news dates and 0 elsewhere. The news impact coefficients are
denoted αpre1 and α
post
1 , respectively. The equations are estimated by OLS using data over the
two-year period from July 26, 2011 to July 25, 2013. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity
robust Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 1%
and 5% level, respectively.
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Table 2.A3: Test for significance of structural break in mean level of herding index
(daily CDS spreads). The table reports the mean level of the daily herding contagion index
and the Chow breakpoint test. The null hypothesis of the Chow test states that there is no
change in the level of herding contagion and the alternative states that there is a change on
a specified date. Panel A pertains to the CAPM benchmark, Equation 2.3. Panel B pertains
to the APT benchmark, Equation 2.4. Panel C pertains to the CAPM benchmark estimated
sequentially over 261-day rolling windows. All three Panels A, B and C corresponds to the 2-
year period around the implicit OMT announcement on July 26, 2012 (specified break date for
Chow test). Panel D corresponds to the 2-year period around the formal OMT announcement
on September 6, 2012 (break date for Chow test). N/A indicates that the herding index is zero
on all days of the 2-year sample period. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% level,
respectively.
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Table 2.A4: Spain news transmission to daily Eurozone CDS spreads before and
after the formal OMT announcement. The table reports the news transmission coef-
ficient obtained through the CAPM benchmark, Equation 2.2, estimated by OLS separately
over two 1-year windows before and after the formal OMT announcement on September 6,
2012. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust Newey-West standard errors are in re-
ported parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.A5: Spain news identification based on daily CDS spreads using alternative
benchmarks (CAPM versus APT) and estimation methods (full sample versus
sequential rolling-window estimation). The table reports salient news dates identified
through the OLS residuals of the CAPM Equation 2.1, first column; APT Equation 2.4, second
column; and via rolling window estimations of both Equation 2.1 and Equation 2.4 in the third
and fourth columns, respectively. Spain-specific news dates that differ from those reported in
Table 4 of the paper are denoted in italics. Panel A and Panel B pertain to the OLS estimation
conducted over two 1-year windows before and after the implicit OMT announcement on July
26, 2012.
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Table 2.A6: Principal component decomposition of daily Eurozone bond yield
spreads. The table reports eigenvalues λj, j = 1, ..., 10 and the proportion of the total variation
in the 10 Eurozone bond spreads explained by each principal component given by λj/
∑
λj.
The last two columns report the eigenvectors or country loadings for the first and second prin-
cipal components (denoted PC1 and PC2). Bond yield spreads are defined with reference to
Germany.
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Table 2.A7: Breakpoint test for changes in the level of principal components derived
from daily Eurozone bond yield spreads over the two-year observation window
around the implicit OMT announcement. The table reports the Chow test (Chow, G.,
1960; Econometrica, 28, pp. 591-501) and Bai and Perron test (Bai, J. & P. Perron, 2003;
Econometrics Journal, 16, pp. 1-22) applied to the first two principal components, PC1 and
PC2, of the daily bond yield spreads of 10 Eurozone country members (Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) from July 26,
2011 to July 25, 2013. Bond yield spreads are defined with reference to Germany. The null
hypothesis of the Chow test is no change and the alternative is that a change occurred at a
specific date (either at the implicit OMT announcement date on July 26, 2012 or at the formal
OMT announcement date on September 6, 2012). The Bai-Perron test allows for multiple
unknown breakpoints. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.A8: Test for significance of differences in mean level of herding index pre-
and post-implicit OMT announcement (daily bond yield spreads). The table reports
the mean level of the daily herding contagion index derived from the CAPM benchmark, Equa-
tion 2.3, estimated with bond yield spread data over the 2-year sample period around the
implicit OMT announcement on July 26, 2012. Bond yield spreads are defined with reference
to Germany. For each country, the European sovereign risk index (∆Europeant) is an aver-
age of bond yield spreads for the remaining 9 Eurozone countries and 4 stand-alone European
countries. The ‘contagion’ euro countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain; the
‘non-contagion’ euro countries are Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal; the
stand-alone countries are Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK. The null hypothesis of the
Chow test says that there is no change in the level of herding contagion and the alternative
that there is a change on July 26, 2012. N/A indicates that the herding index is zero on all
days of the sample period. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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Table 2.A9: Test for significance of within-Eurozone contagion proxied by the second
principal component of daily Eurozone CDS spreads. The table reports the OLS esti-
mates and Newey-West h.a.c. t-statistics for the second principal component of daily Eurozone
CDS spreads (denoted PC2 in the paper) as an additional regressor in the CAPM Equation 2.2
without the Spain-news variable; see Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2012). The principal components
are extracted from the correlation matrix of daily CDS spreads of 10 Eurozone countries (Aus-
tria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain)
over the two-year observation period around the informal OMT announcement from July 26,
2011 to July 25, 2013. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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Chapter 3
Domestic banks as lightning rods?
Home bias during Eurozone crisis
“The same personal and professional ties that may allow sovereigns to apply moral suasion
on domestic banks might also give domestic bankers better information about the likelihood of
sovereign default or repayment.”
Ethan Ilzetzki, in Economic Policy Discussion Panel (2014)
3.1 Introduction
Can domestic banks act as lightning rods for government bonds in the midst of a financial storm?
On the contrary, by now, the deathly loop between sovereign and bank credit risks has been very
well documented. Increasing risk pressures in the banking sector may put unnecessary burden
on public finances due to potential future bailout costs and negative spillovers to the lending
in real economy. In turn, a spike in the sovereign credit risk might trigger a deterioration
in the banking sector through losses on banks’ government bond holdings and the loss of
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credibility for future government support (Acharya, Drechsler, & Schnabl, 2014). However,
despite this adverse feedback mechanism, the link between governments and their domestic
banks may have a silver lining: local banks might have soft information advantages regarding
their clients thanks to their “daily exposure to local news stories, first-hand knowledge of
the local economy, and personal relationships with key people at the issuing body” (Butler,
2008). During market downturns, such informational advantage might lead them to act as
buyers of last resort absorbing the local assets while (potentially uninformed) foreign banks
shed their exposures in panic. This is especially possible when markets generally move in
a self-fulfillingly pessimistic way ignoring fundamental information regarding the solvency of
individual countries, as recently illustrated in the context of the Eurozone crisis (De Grauwe &
Ji, 2013; Saka, Fuertes, & Kalotychou, 2015).
In this paper, I present evidence for the latter view. I show that when European banks retreated
from the sovereign debt markets of the crisis countries in the Eurozone, they did less so for
the countries to which they were informationally closer. To put it another way, ceteris paribus,
a bank whose home country had better linkages with a target country (measured in terms of
geographical distance or cross-border banking activities) increased its relative exposure when
that target country was struck by a sovereign debt crisis. This result holds even among the
foreign banks and does not depend on the alternative mechanisms such as the risk-shifting
tendency of the individual bank, the political strength of its home country or the exchange
rate/redenomination risk. Furthermore, the relationship between information and sovereign
risk is much stronger in general terms rather than being specific to the episodes of extreme
sovereign stress. Hence, I interpret these findings as supportive of the view that informational
asymmetries among banks played a key role in the recent fragmentation across Eurozone debt
markets.
Figure 3.1 clearly illustrates the puzzling phenomenon that this paper aims to address. Since
early 2010, Eurozone banks have lifted up their home bias for sovereign debt, especially in crisis
countries. That is, at the peak of the government debt problems, banks started accumulating
domestic government bonds. The initial rise and the gradual reversal of this trend -along with
the respective bond spreads- is visible only in periphery part of the Eurozone. In contrast, the
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corresponding bias in core Euro countries seems to have been more or less stable throughout
the Eurozone crisis. Intriguingly, the observation still stands in Figure 3.2 even after correcting
for how much of the domestic debt the banks should hold in a standard Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM).1
With the dismal interaction between sovereign and banking crisis in the background, most of the
recent literature attributed this observation to the argument of financial repression/moral sua-
sion (Becker & Ivashina, 2014; De Marco & Macchiavelli, 2015; Ongena, Popov, & Van Horen,
2016). In other words, in order to gain relief from crisis and to be able to roll-over their
debts, governments may have (implicitly) forced the banks in their jurisdiction to increase do-
mestic sovereign exposures. Pointing to the highly positive correlations between government-
relatedness2 and public bond holdings of the banks, these papers argue that there has been a
clear tendency of troubled governments to impose moral suasion on the banks that they can
control. From this perspective, the resulting home bias has been mostly involuntary for domes-
tic banks and created an unnecessary burden on the financial health of the banking sectors in
crisis countries.
Another competing argument for the repatriation of public debt from non-crisis to crisis coun-
tries is based on the assumption that governments would be less willing to default if their debt
was held by the domestic agents rather than foreign ones due to the costs such a default would
inflict on the domestic economy (Broner, Martin, & Ventura, 2010; Gennaioli, Martin, & Rossi,
2014b). Hence, in the existence of well-functioning secondary markets, sovereign debt should
naturally be reallocated back to host countries as domestic agents will attach a higher value
to these securities than their foreign counterparts. According to this view, the resulting home
bias has been a dark side-effect of secondary bond markets and might have even benefited the
creditors if it eventually decreased governments’ willingness to default. With respect to this
argument, Figure 3.3 illustrates the evolution of the home bias for different types of creditors
in the Eurozone periphery and core countries. Though it is clear from Panel A that resident
1As discussed later in the Data section, a simple asset pricing model would predict that banks must hold
sovereign debt in proportion to the relative weight of their sovereign portfolio in the universe of total sovereign
bond holdings.
2Either through direct government ownership of the bank or political links in the board of directors.
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banks in the periphery accumulated a big portion of domestic sovereign debt, this is hardly true
for other non-bank residents in the same countries, which goes against the intuition of Broner
et al. (2010) and asks for a further link between resident banks and government debt.
This paper proposes an alternative channel and shows that European banks’ increasing sovereign
home bias in crisis countries is not so surprising if one takes into account one of the most con-
ventional (albeit lately-forgotten) theories of the home bias in asset markets: informational
frictions (Brennan & Cao, 1997; Van Nieuwerburgh & Veldkamp, 2009; Dziuda & Mondria,
2012). As true for risky asset classes (e.g. equity), home bias usually exists when there is an
informational advantage in favour of domestic agents. In tranquil periods and well-integrated
markets such as in Europe, one would not expect to observe a high level of home bias in risk-
free sovereign debt.3 Nonetheless, in crisis episodes during which government debt gets risky, it
becomes crucial to have soft information regarding the true repayment intentions of the govern-
ment and thus market behaviour might deviate from publicly observed hard information such as
debt/gdp ratios or growth rates of individual countries. In that case, uninformed foreign banks
may naturally rush to exit these markets in panic, selling most of their exposures to domestic
banks at fire-sale prices. Such market trajectory is indeed compatible with the evidence in
De Grauwe & Ji (2013) and Saka et al. (2015) who detect the apparent disconnection between
bond spreads and the publicly observable hard information (i.e., country fundamentals) during
the Eurozone crisis.
By taking a global portfolio approach and using a novel bank-level dataset compiled from
various stress-tests, transparency and capital exercises of the European Banking Authority
(EBA), I first re-confirm that European banks’ home bias increased and sovereign debt was
indeed reallocated from foreign to domestic banks at the peak of the crisis. Consistent with
Acharya & Steffen (2015) and Crosignani (2015), I also find evidence of risk-shifting behaviour
for banks located in crisis countries; however it is also shown that home bias goes much beyond
this behaviour. Interestingly, and in contrast with the secondary market theory of Broner et al.
(2010), this reallocation does not seem to be visible at all for the domestic agents other than
3This can be seen in Figure 3.3 as the average home bias for resident banks in both core and periphery
countries is around 15 percent in early 2009 before it doubles in the periphery at the peak of the crisis.
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banks. Additionally, I illustrate that, in response to crisis, private forms of debt (retail and
corporate) in bank balance sheets have experienced an equally large (if not larger) increase in
home bias. This finding is not easy to reconcile with the moral suasion story unless one assumes
that, in a sovereign debt turmoil, governments would prioritise pressuring local banks to buy
private sector debt more than that of their own. On the other hand, this finding is what one
would expect from informationally more sensitive assets (e.g. private debt) if crisis episodes
were associated with informational frictions. Finally, I present a direct information channel
and demonstrate that European banks headquartered in informationally-closer territories have
increased their relative exposures to troubled countries. This effect is robust to controlling for
various alternative channels and changing sample compositions.
Sovereign debt crises in a well-integrated monetary union constitutes an ideal setting to isolate
the effect of information asymmetry on bank behaviour. Avoiding the cross-country differences
in exchange rates, liquidity provision or collateral requirements, this paper presents evidence
that information (or the lack thereof) played a key role in recent fragmentation across Eurozone
debt markets. Thus, revisiting the initial question, it is possible that domestic banks may
have acted as lightning rods collecting the sovereign debt while governments suffered from
informational frictions as foreign banks left the market in panic, triggering a financial storm.
Despite the so-called doom loop between the two, the relationship between governments and
domestic banks may have an underexplored silver lining.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section briefly outlines the relevant back-
ground literature. Section 3 describes the data. The empirical methodology and results are
presented in section 4. Final section concludes the paper.
57
Chapter 3. Domestic banks as lightning rods? Home bias during Eurozone crisis
3.2 The Related Literature
3.2.1 Recent home bias in the Eurozone
The main motivation of the paper comes from the recently-aroused interest in academic and
policy circles on the causes of rising fragmentation -home bias- across Eurozone sovereign debt
markets. One of the earlier contributions by Becker & Ivashina (2014) illustrates the positive
association between country-level government ownership in the banking sector and domestic
government bond holdings of the banks. They further extend this finding by showing that
crisis-country banks with a higher number of government-affiliated board members hold more
government bonds in their balance sheets. De Marco & Macchiavelli (2015) follow a similar path
to point out that, upon receiving liquidity injections, only politically-related European banks
increased their exposure to domestic sovereign debt. Using a proprietary bank-level dataset
from European Central Bank (ECB), Ongena et al. (2016) demonstrate that, compared to
foreign ones, domestic banks were more inclined to increase their exposures when governments
had to roll-over large chunks of outstanding public debt. Many other recent papers confirm
these observations (Horva´th, Huizinga, & Ioannidou, 2015; Altavilla, Pagano, & Simonelli,
2016b) and conclude that a moral suasion channel was in operation during Eurozone crisis.4
Nonetheless, none of these studies take into account the possible information channel that might
have been active between governments and related banks. By constructing an identification
strategy based on the heterogeneity across foreign banks and thus minimising the moral suasion
concerns, I contribute to this literature and illustrate that information was a key determinant
in recent sovereign debt reallocation across European banks.
Another strand of home bias literature specific to sovereign debt underlines the assumption
that it is harder for governments to default on their promises when most of the debt is held
domestically. In such a scenario, government would rather choose not to default since the
benefits could be offset by its harm on the domestic economy. Hence, in expectation of this by
4These findings are not always consistent though. For example, using the same source of data as in Ongena
et al. (2016), Altavilla et al. (2016b) find evidence for moral suasion also in core Eurozone countries, which
ex-post is hard to reconcile with the observation that these countries did not have any difficulty in rolling over
their debts at the time.
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local agents, government debt will flow back to the host country during times of rising sovereign
risk (Broner et al., 2010). Analysing a vast database covering 191 countries, Gennaioli, Martin,
& Rossi (2014a) show empirical patterns consistent with this prediction although they cannot
differentiate between domestic and foreign bonds at the bank-level. In a recent paper, Brutti
& Saure´ (2016) present confirming evidence in the context of Eurozone crisis by demonstrating
that reallocation was more intense for sovereign debt than the private one. Furthermore, debt
of the crisis governments tended toward those banks whose countries were politically more
powerful in the Euro area, implying that debt reallocation was mainly driven to discourage
the troubled governments from declaring bankruptcy. By using a dataset covering the entire
Eurozone crisis episode for 30 European countries at the bank-level, I complement and challenge
these findings: I find that reallocation of sovereign debt indeed occurred in the Eurozone crisis;
however this only holds for domestic banks as opposed to other domestic agents, which goes
against the earlier prediction of Broner et al. (2010). Furthermore, compared to government
debt, retail and corporate debt in bank balance-sheets suffered equally (if not more) from an
increase in home bias in response to crisis, which is hard to reconcile with the earlier finding of
Brutti & Saure´ (2016) who only focus on the first part of the Eurozone crisis in their sample
period with a limited coverage of European countries.5 Finally, I find weak evidence for the
argument that political strength of the banks’ home countries mattered in debt reallocation
and show that my estimations are robust to the inclusion of such variables.
A related literature focuses on the risk-shifting tendency of the undercapitalized banks. Ac-
cording to this argument, banks with low capital ratios prefer high-risk instruments such as the
government bonds of crisis countries so that the shareholders would benefit from a resurrection
of the country while their losses would be limited in case of a default. (Acharya & Steffen, 2015;
Horva´th et al., 2015). However, this argument does not necessarily explain why weak banks
would especially risk-shift by accumulating domestic government bonds rather than the bonds
of other governments struck by crisis. In line with Crosignani (2015), I find evidence that (po-
tentially weak) banks located in crisis countries shift their sovereign portfolios more favourably
towards other countries in crisis; but this behaviour is found to be much more prominent when
5Their sample period goes from 2007 to late-2011 and is mainly restricted to Eurozone countries with also
some non-European countries such as Brazil and Mexico.
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it is the domestic government who is in crisis, indicating the need for a further investigation of
the link between banks and domestic sovereign bond holdings.
3.2.2 Home bias in other markets
There are many studies exploring the home bias in portfolio holdings of different asset classes.
Most of this literature focuses on equity holdings (French & Poterba, 1991) whereas others look
at the regional biases in international bond portfolios of various country groups (Lane, 2005).
Previous studies mainly revolve around three broad categorical explanations for home bias:
exchange rate risk, transaction costs and informational frictions (Coeurdacier & Rey, 2013).
In the specific context of Europe, with the increasing financial integration and exchange rate
stability over the years, it is reasonable to argue that the most realistic culprit for the recently
sky-rocketing home bias would be the informational asymmetries.
Brennan & Cao (1997), for example, model the sensitivity to asset-related news when there is
a difference between informational endowments of domestic and foreign agents. They illustrate
that, in such a scenario, home bias would be positively associated with the negative news as
foreign investors would try to infer the local information from past asset prices and react more
to such news.6 On a similar path, Van Nieuwerburgh & Veldkamp (2009) show that, in the
existence of (initially small) informational differences, costly information acquisition process
may boost the agents’ home bias. Lastly, Dziuda & Mondria (2012) demonstrate that, even in
the portfolios of sophisticated institutions such as investment funds, home bias may arise due
to the fact that fund investors would be better at judging the performance of fund managers
when they invest in local assets rather than foreign ones. Therefore, one might observe home
bias even in the portfolios of highly sophisticated institutions such as banks or mutual funds.
Following the intuition that informational frictions might lie behind the widely-observed home
bias for various asset classes,7 many researchers have empirically studied the effects of several
6Inspired by Brennan & Cao (1997), there is a stream of studies in the asset-pricing literature that detect
the foreign investors’ trend-following behaviour. See Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999; 2005); Grinblatt & Keloharju
(2000); Froot, Oconnell, & Seasholes (2001); Griffin, Nardari, & Stulz (2004); Richards (2005).
7For further evidence on the informational advantage that domestic investors may hold vis-a`-vis foreign
investors, see Kang & Stulz (1997); Kim & Wei (2002) and Kaufmann, Mehrez, & Schmukler (2005).
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forms of informational-distance on portfolio holdings. For instance, Coval and Moskowitz (1999,
2001) find that geographical proximity is crucial for US investors’ portfolio composition and
the risk-adjusted returns, even within the same country. Grinblatt & Keloharju (2001) discover
that investors might be biased towards firms that are close to them in terms of physical location,
culture and language of communication. Hau (2001) exemplifies a case in which professional
traders located in Germany or in German-speaking cities make more profit in German stocks.
Finally, Portes & Rey (2005) conclude that geographical distance matters for cross-border
capital flows; however it mostly proxies the effects of other informational variables such as
bank branches across countries or telephone call traffic. I borrow the informational distance
proxies (such as geographical distance and bank branches) from this literature and contribute
to it by extending their evidence to the scope of Eurozone crisis.
3.3 Data Description
The main body of data that I use in the paper comes from various stress-tests, transparency and
recapitalization exercises that are undertaken by the European Banking Authority (EBA) over
the course of 5 years for a large set of European banks covering 30 members of the European
Economic Area (EEA). The first of these disclosures was undertaken by the Committee of
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), which was comprised of senior representatives of bank
supervisory authorities and central banks of the European Union and later succeeded by the
EBA. Its results were made public by national regulators at the time; however EBA does not
provide the related data. Hence, this dataset was obtained from the Peterson Institute for
International Economics while all other datasets were acquired from EBA.
Table 3.1 lists these exercises and the disclosure dates for each of them together with how
many banks and which information dates were covered. 10 data time-points start from the first
quarter of 2010 and goes all the way to the second quarter of 2015, thus covering the start, rise
and fall of the Eurozone crisis. Sovereign bond holdings are reported for each data time-point
while private credit exposures (corporate, retail, etc.) can be found for 6 of these. In each
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disclosure, the full country-breakdown of each bank’s debt portfolio for up to 200 countries can
be found.8 However, to focus on the debt reallocation across Europe, only exposures to 30 EEA
countries are included in the sample.
The main banks involved in the exercises mostly stay the same even though some smaller banks
are added and subtracted from one exercise to another. All exposures are consolidated at the
parent bank level and each exercise involves banks with at least 65% of the total banking
assets in Europe and 50% of the banking sector of each EEA member. Compared to other
studies using proprietary datasets from European Central Bank (Ongena et al., 2016; Altavilla
et al., 2016b), EBA data cover banks from a wider range of countries (including non-Eurozone)
and documents finer granularity in terms of full country-breakdowns of sovereign exposures at
bank-level.
I am mainly interested in what portion of a sovereign’s total debt is held by a specific bank.
Thus the main variable of interest (SovereignPortionb,c,t) measures each bank’s (b) nominal
exposure to a certain country (c) at a certain time-point (t) divided by the total nominal
exposure of all the banks for that country at that time. That is;
SovereignPortionb,c,t =
NominalExposureb,c,t∑
b
NominalExposureb,c,t
It is important to note that this measure is independent of the valuation technique used for
the bank-level sovereign exposures as long as all the banks apply the same methodology at a
given point in time, which is the case in my sample as all disclosures are centrally directed and
homogenized by the EBA. This helps me better quantify the relative distribution of sovereign
debt across banks. Furthermore, by construction, SovereignPortionb,c,t does not depend on the
price changes as these are automatically reflected in all banks’ nominal exposures and thus does
not change the particular portion that a specific bank holds out of the total debt. Therefore,
it constitutes an ideal measure to understand the reallocation of sovereign debt over time.9
8Except the first disclosure undertaken by CEBS in which only exposures to 30 European countries can be
found.
9As an alternative dependent variable, I later use sovereign exposures directly in log form [log(1 +
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In line with the mainstream literature on home bias (Ahearne, Griever, & Warnock, 2004;
Coeurdacier & Rey, 2013), I also create an alternative variable that takes into account an
optimal portion of sovereign debt that should be held by a bank according to a standard
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This variable (SovereignPortionBiasb,c,t) takes the
difference between our main variable of interest (SovereignPortionb,c,t) and the portion that
is suggested by the CAPM model (SovereignPortionCAPMb,t).
10 As conventional in the
literature, this difference is standardized by the share of other banks’ portfolios in the global
portfolio (1− SovereignPortionCAPMb,t).11 That is;
SovereignPortionBiasb,c,t =
SovereignPortionb,c,t − SovereignPortionCAPMb,t
1− SovereignPortionCAPMb,t
where
SovereignPortionCAPMb,t =
∑
c
NominalExposureb,c,t∑
b,c
NominalExposureb,c,t
If bias variable SovereignPortionBiasb,c,t takes the value of 1, it means all of the country’s
debt is held by the specific bank, thus perfect home bias. If it is zero, that means the bank holds
exactly the portion of the debt suggested by the CAPM model, thus no home bias. For the later
section of the study, I create the corresponding variable for retail exposures (RetailPortionb,c,t)
exactly in the same way as described above and then merge it with the sovereign exposure
variable under a single variable name (DebtPortiond,b,c,t) where (d) denotes the type of debt
in consideration.
To construct the dummy variable Crisisc,t, the daily yields of 10-year maturity bonds of 30 Eu-
ropean countries are obtained from Datastream.12 In the next step, I follow a similar approach
NominalExposureb,c,t)] and confirm that my findings are unchanged. Results are available upon request.
10Notice that CAPM concludes the optimal portion that a bank would hold in an equilibrium setting should
depend only on the size of the bank’s sovereign portfolio and the size of the global sovereign portfolio. Hence,
it does not depend on the specific country of exposure (c).
11In unreported estimations (available upon request), I check my results without this standardization and
show that none of my findings depend on it.
12Bond yields for two countries (Estonia and Liechtenstein) are not available on Datastream; so these obser-
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to Brutti & Saure´ (2016) and categorize a country as “in crisis” (Crisisc,t) if a country is a
Euro member and its average daily bond spreads (with respect to Germany) for the previous
three months was above 400 basis points.13
To be able to differentiate between different types of creditors, a measure of sovereign holdings
for non-bank agents is needed. Unfortunately, EBA datasets only contain information about
banks. Hence, I resort to a country-level dataset compiled from various national sources by
Merler & Pisani-Ferry (2012), which lists the portion of a country’s total debt held by its resident
banks and non-bank residents.14 Observations cover 11 European countries15 at quarterly
intervals, starting from 1990s. For consistency, I choose the same period covered by the EBA
dataset, from 2010-Q1 to 2015-Q2. For the panel estimations, I create a dependent variable
called DomesticPortionc,k,t, which measures the portion of a country’s (c) debt held by a
certain domestic creditor (k: ResidentsBanks or OtherResidents) at a certain time-point (t).
Finally, to proxy the informational linkages across countries, I construct 3 different variables in
line with the previous home bias literature (Portes, Rey, & Oh, 2001; Portes & Rey, 2005). First
one, CrossCountryDistancel,c, measures the geographical distance (in thousand kilometres)
between the capital city of the bank’s home country (l) and the capital city of the exposure
country (c). Second one, CrossCountryBranchesl,c, represents the total number of bank
branches (in thousands) in the exposure country of the bank which ultimately belong to a bank
from its home country.16 Finally, CrossCountryMergersl,c is the total number of bank mergers
(in hundreds) that occurred between the home country and the exposure country in the years
starting from 1985 all the way up to pre-crisis period (2008) in Europe. Geographical distance
information is derived via MapQuest. The snapshot of banks’ branch networks as of February,
vations are dropped from the sample.
13Various robustness checks are conducted later by using different crisis definitions (See Section 3.4.6).
14Importantly for our purposes, ‘other residents’ category does not include the public agencies or central
banks, so we can assume that these are private non-bank parties/institutions.
15These are Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
United Kingdom. Data for Belgium and Finland can only be found annually; so I linearly interpolated the data
to get quarterly values for these two countries.
16This variable is created by taking all of the ultimate-parent banks located in 30 EEA countries available
in SNL database, independent of whether the bank is included in EBA dataset or not. The purpose here is
to capture the non-time-varying banking linkages across countries. Hence, it is important to consider the full
sample available rather than only the restricted EBA sample (though results do not depend on this). This data
covers 137,284 bank branches in total which is 92% of all bank branches (149,242) in these countries, estimated
using World Bank data for 2014 (see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5).
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2016, is acquired from SNL Financial17 while the merger data come from SDC Platinum.
Table 3.2 gives summary statistics for these variables. It is important to note that for Sovereign-
Portion variable, more than half of the observations contain zero values. However, these are
meaningful zeros, implying that the bank does not have any exposure to that sovereign at that
certain point in time. When the mean levels across general and domestic samples are compared,
one can clearly see the inclination of the banks to hold a higher fraction of the government debt
of their own countries. The same can also be said for retail debt (RetailPortion). When we
compare different debt categories for domestic bank samples, we see that a bank on average
holds a higher fraction of its country’s retail debt (0.164) than it holds its country’s sovereign
debt (0.126). This observation is consistent with the information asymmetry view of home bias,
predicting that -in general- informationally more sensitive assets (private debt) should suffer
more from home bias than other more standardized assets (public debt) would do.
3.4 Methodology & Results
3.4.1 Sovereign home bias during crisis
The first step in my analysis is to capture the effect of crisis on the sovereign home bias
of the European banks. For this purpose, I employ a simple difference-in-differences (DD)
methodology, which assumes that banks’ home bias should share a parallel trend in the absence
of crisis. A simple look at Panel A of Figure 3.3 confirms the fact that banks’ home bias in core
and periphery countries moved in tandem with each other prior to the Eurozone crisis. Hence,
17Unfortunately, the branch information is not available historically and SNL Financial only provides the most
recent data available. However, to the extent that the current data is representative of the non-time-varying
cross-country banking linkages, it is reasonable to assume that estimates would not be biased in any particular
direction. Additionally, CrossCountryMergersl,c variable overcomes this timing problem by providing pre-
crisis picture of cross-country information linkages.
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I go on to estimate the following model:
SovereignPortionl,b,c,t = β1(Crisisc,t × Domesticl,c) + β0Domesticl,c + θb,t + γc,t + εl,b,c,t
(3.1)
where (l) denotes the home country of the bank, (b) identifies the specific bank, (c) is for
the country of exposure and (t) specifies the time dimension. All variables are constructed as
previously explained in the Data Description section. Controls include a broad set of fixed-
effects at the levels of Bank*Time (θb,t) and ExposureCountry*Time (γc,t). Thus, the model
controls for the overall effects of the crisis both at the home country (since banks never change
their home country) and exposure country levels and Crisis dummy can only enter the re-
gression in an interaction term. Additionally, Domesticl,c is a dummy variable which is equal
to 1 if the bank’s headquarters are located in the country of exposure (i.e., l=c). In this
model, β0 should give us an idea about the general level and significance of the sovereign home
bias in European banks and β1 measures the additional effect of the crisis on this home bias.
Same model is also estimated for the alternative dependent variable with CAPM adjustment
(SovereignPortionBiasl,b,c,t).
Results are presented in Table 3.3. Columns I-II and V-VI confirm the previous literature that
banks do have home bias in their sovereign debt holdings. It is economically meaningful as well
at a level around 0.126. Given that average sovereign holding in our sample is around 0.01, this
finding clearly illustrates that a bank holds a much bigger portion of a country’s debt when
it comes to its own country. Columns III-IV and VII-VIII of the same table ratifies another
observation that is compatible with the previous literature: the sovereign home bias of domestic
banks increases during times of crisis (Gennaioli et al., 2014a; Brutti & Saure´, 2016). The effect
is economically huge: the portion of a country’s debt held by a representative domestic bank
almost doubles in response to crisis.18 Hence, the link between a sovereign debt crisis and the
absorption of government bonds by the domestic banks is arguably established at this stage.
18This result is also compatible with the recent bank lending literature showing that, during a financial crisis,
international banks demonstrate a stronger home bias in terms of syndicated loan issuance (Giannetti & Laeven,
2012) or cut credit less in markets that are geographically close (De Haas & Van Horen, 2013).
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However, with this simple observation, it is not yet possible to differentiate among alternative
channels that may lead to that rising home bias.
3.4.2 Risk-shifting in crisis-country banks
Findings in Table 3.3 are compatible with information asymmetry, secondary markets or moral
suasion stories of the home bias. One may also argue that banks in crisis countries are especially
weakly-capitalised, which drives them to invest more in their home country bonds to benefit
from shifting the risk onto their creditors (Crosignani, 2015). However, if this is the case, one
would expect these banks to also invest in other high-risk countries.
To check for the risk-shifting tendency of banks located in troubled countries, I estimate the
following model and separate the home bias phenomenon from the risk-shifting story:
SovereignPortionl,b,c,t = β2(Domesticl,c × Crisisc,t × StressedBankl,t)
+ β1(Crisisc,t × StressedBankl,t) + β0Domesticl,c + θb,t + γc,t + εl,b,c,t (3.2)
where StressedBankl,t is a dummy variable representing those observations in which the home
country of the bank (l) is considered to be in crisis at a certain time (t). All other variables are
constructed as previously explained. Due to time-varying fixed effects at the bank and exposure
country levels, Crisis and StressedBank dummies can only enter the regression in interaction
with other variables.19
Model 3.2 checks for risk-shifting behaviour of (potentially weak) banks located in crisis coun-
tries, in line with Crosignani (2015). If the rising home bias in crisis countries is mainly due
to risk-shifting, one should observe a similar tendency of crisis-country banks to shift their
portfolios towards all crisis countries no matter if it is domestic or foreign. This is captured by
β1. On the other hand, β2 measures the additional effect of crisis on domestic exposures that
19For conciseness, additional two-way interactions of Domestic*Crisis and Domestic*StressedBank are
dropped from the estimation since coefficients are both insignificant and their inclusion does not change the
results in any meaningful way.
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cannot be explained by the general level of risk-shifting in these crisis-country banks.
Columns I and III in Table 3.4 confirm the earlier predictions by showing that crisis-country
banks actually expand their relative exposure to all other crisis countries, potentially risk-
shifting. However, as illustrated in columns II and IV, this behaviour is much heavier for the
home exposures of these banks, thus indicating that risk-shifting may contribute to the rising
home bias in crisis countries but is not even nearly a sufficient explanation. The magnitude of
response to a crisis in home country is more than tenfold higher than that to a crisis in a foreign
country (0.104 vs 0.008). Indeed, banks located in troubled countries have a special preference
for their own government bonds which goes much beyond their risk-shifting incentives.
3.4.3 Bank vs. non-bank domestic creditors
As discussed previously, secondary markets hypothesis states that the increase in banks’ sovereign
home bias might be related to the presumption that government bonds would be more valuable
(due to governments being less willing to default) when they are held domestically. Thus, in
the existence of well-functioning secondary markets, debt would naturally flow from foreign
to domestic agents. In addition, if redenomination (Eurozone break-up) risk was particularly
high for crisis countries, this may have pushed up the selling pressure especially for the foreign
investors since they may risk ending up with a currency mismatch between their assets and
liabilities in case of a crisis country declaring its exit from the Eurosystem (Battistini, Pagano,
& Simonelli, 2014).
However, neither of these channels is specific to banks and, if they were prominent, one could
expect to see a rising home bias not only for domestic banks but also for other types of agents
in crisis countries. Hence, I differentiate the effect of the crisis on the home bias of different
domestic agents operating in the same economy. For this purpose, I use the Bruegel dataset at
country-level and estimate the following model:
DomesticPortionc,k,t = β1(ResidentBanksk × Crisisc,t) + λk,t + γc,t + εc,k,t (3.3)
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where (c) is for the country, (k) is for the creditor type and (t) is for different quarters of
the year. ResidentBanksk is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the creditor (k) of the
country is its resident banks and zero if it is other private non-bank residents. All other
variables are constructed as previously explained. Controls include Creditor*Time (λk,t) and
Country*Time (γc,t) fixed effects, which should absorb all the time-varying country and creditor
characteristics.20 The coefficient of interest is β1, which signals whether or not domestic banks
behaved somewhat differently compared to other domestic agents.
Table 3.5 compares the responses of two types of domestic agents during crisis. Although sta-
tistically insignificant, Column I indicates that the crisis leads domestic agents to decrease their
home bias on average, which is counter-intuitive with respect to our earlier finding. However,
when I separate the differential response of bank creditors, column II confirms that resident
banks in crisis countries are more likely to increase their home bias whereas other non-bank res-
idents seem to have moved in the opposite direction. This finding holds even when time-varying
shocks for each creditor are accounted for (columns III-IV) together with national shocks that
may impact both creditors at the same time (column IV). Hence, this finding goes against the
secondary-markets hypothesis arguing that, during crisis times, government debt should flow
back to the home country irrespective of the resident type since government would then prefer
keeping its promise not to harm the domestic economy. Although it could be argued that
governments “care” more about the banking sector and hence it should be more reasonable
that sovereign debt flows to resident banks, one would still expect to see a somewhat positive
response for other non-bank residents as well, which does not seem to be visible at all in our
findings.
Furthermore, even though the Eurozone could be said to have come to the verge of a break-up
in the midst of the crisis, it is not easy to conclude that redenomination risk was instrumental
in banks’ sovereign exposure behaviour since it does not seem to have affected other types of
investors resident in the same troubled countries. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that,
since different investors may tend towards different kinds of domestic assets to hedge for the
20Notice that with full saturation of fixed effects, ResidentBanks and Crisis dummies can only enter the
regression in interaction form.
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currency risk, the ideal setting to test for the redenomination risk would be the case in which
we could see the creditor decomposition (bank vs non-bank) of all asset classes rather than
only that of sovereign debt. However, in the absence of a more comprehensive dataset and a
legitimate argument for why non-bank residents should especially avoid hedging via government
bonds, it is safe to say that redenomination risk was not substantial.21
3.4.4 Sovereign vs. private debt home bias
Most of the recent literature has focused on the European banks’ sovereign home bias although
this behaviour might have been just a sub-observation of a more general phenomenon. Thus, I
would also like to compare the effect of the crisis on home bias across various assets classes held
by the European banks. For this purpose, I use a more generalized model as in the following
and differentiate the home bias of two debt types in both normal and crisis times:
DebtPortiond,l,b,c,t = β3(Sovereignd × Crisisc,t ×Domesticl,c) + β2(Crisisc,t ×Domesticl,c)
+ β1(Sovereignd ×Domesticl,c) + β0(Retaild ×Domesticl,c)
+ ζd + θb,t + γc,t + εd,l,b,c,t (3.4)
where Sovereignd and Retaild are dummy variables indicating the respective asset classes. All
other variables are constructed as previously explained.22 The coefficients β1 and β0 should give
us an idea about the home bias in these different asset classes in general. β2 reflects the overall
effect of the crisis on the home bias for both asset classes and β3 should tell us if the increase
in home bias was stronger for sovereign debt, as would be suggested by the other competing
theories of home bias (moral suasion and secondary market theory).
To get a better sense of whether sovereign debt was the only asset that has suffered from home
bias during crisis, Table 3.6 draws the following comparison. Columns I and V confirm that
21Also see the extra analysis undertaken in Section 3.4.6 to control for redenomination risk.
22To focus on the main coefficients of interest, the two-way interaction of Sovereign*Crisis is dropped from
the estimation since the coefficient is statistically insignificant and its inclusion does not change the results in
any meaningful way.
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there is a significant home bias across both assets classes together. When I separate the home
bias for different assets, columns II and VI show that the magnitude of general home bias for
retail debt (0.167) is more than 30 percent higher than the one for sovereign debt (0.126) and
the difference between these two coefficients is statistically significant, which is perfectly in line
with the information asymmetry theory of home bias. Compared to standard products such as
government securities, informationally more sensitive assets such as retail debt should be held
more by the domestic agents who have an advantage in reaching the relevant information for
such assets (Portes et al., 2001; Portes & Rey, 2005).
The remaining columns in Table 3.6 provide even more interesting results. Columns III and VII
show that crisis has a positively significant effect on home bias for both asset classes. Columns
IV and VIII shed light on the additional response of the sovereign debt to crisis, but there
seems to be none. At best, this additional effect is negative (-0.026, though not statistically
significant), meaning that it is the retail debt that may suffer more intensely from home bias
in times of crisis. Obviously, this finding is again consistent with the expectation that, during
crisis episodes that are usually associated with rising informational frictions, informationally
sensitive assets should experience a much larger reallocation from foreign to domestic agents.
For robustness, the same analysis is repeated with the corporate debt in Table 3.A1. Not
surprisingly, results are very much in line: in general, European banks have a higher home bias
in their corporate exposures and, compared to sovereign debt, this bias rises at least equally in
response to a crisis in a country.23 Overall, it seems that the recent sovereign debt reallocation
in Europe could be a part of a more general phenomenon (such as informational frictions) that
may have influenced all asset classes simultaneously.
3.4.5 Effect of informational distance on banks’ sovereign exposures
It is already well established in the literature that the proximity to the borrower matters for
the banks’ lending behaviour and it usually determines the amount of soft information that the
23In another unreported robustness check, I repeat the analysis by only including EBA disclosure dates in
which both types of debt exposures were disclosed (6 dates; see Table 3.1) and find that results are unchanged.
71
Chapter 3. Domestic banks as lightning rods? Home bias during Eurozone crisis
bank could gather to serve its customers.24 Of course, one could think that the government
bond markets are not necessarily the kind that soft information would matter the most. Indi-
cators (such as tax revenue or fiscal balance) showing the strength of government’s ability to
pay back its debt are publicly available and easily accessible by market participants. Neverthe-
less, an interesting feature of the government debt markets is that, while corporate bankruptcy
is always about the (in)ability of a company to repay, a sovereign default is -in most cases-
a political decision and directly related to the degree of governing party’s willingness to cut
back government spending or increase tax rates. This crucial difference between corporate and
sovereign debt arises due to the lack of a legal mechanism to enforce repayment on sovereigns
(Panizza, Sturzenegger, & Zettelmeyer, 2009) and makes it especially important in times of
stress to have insider information on government’s willingness to honour its promises or coun-
try’s political capacity to endure further budget cuts. Such soft information could be obtained
via domestic banks’ local/political connections or simply being more familiar with the country,
its daily news and local economic and political climate.25 In that respect, Butler (2008) illus-
trates a case in which local investment banks underwriting municipal bonds have comparative
advantage in accessing and assessing soft information, especially when the bond is risky.
What is then so special about domestic banks over other types of domestic agents? First of
all, domestic banks are the main players in the government debt markets. Figure 3.3 clearly
illustrates that even before the crisis in Euro periphery, domestic banks held almost as much
sovereign debt as that of all other domestic agents combined. This could give the banks a com-
parative edge in pricing of government securities.26 Secondly, banks are natural information-
gatherers for their economies. They transact with almost every sector of the domestic businesses
and gain in-advance information on how well the overall economy may perform over the coming
months/quarters, which would have a tremendous effect over government’s ability to raise tax
revenues and pay back its debt. Thirdly, banks are the agents with the greatest access to liq-
24See, among many others, Mian (2006), Alessandrini, Presbitero, & Zazzaro (2009) and Agarwal & Hauswald
(2010).
25Here, I interpret familiarity as an accumulated informational advantage rather than a behavioural bias
although the previous literature is somewhat ambiguous on this (see Huberman, 2001).
26Home bias might also arise simply due to domestic banks’ responsibility to act as primary dealers or market
makers in the sovereign debt markets. Ongena et al. (2016) provide contrary evidence that most of the market
makers in periphery countries during crisis were foreign banks and this did not have any effect on domestic
banks’ home bias.
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uidity (via central banks) in times of financial crises. Hence, in a liquidity crunch, governments
may find it easier to signal their intentions/plans to local banks than any other local agent.
Last but not least, public ownership in the banking sector is still more common relative to
other sectors, which does not only give the government a tool to pressure banks, but also opens
the possible communication channels that can transmit crucial soft information during times
of sovereign stress (Ilzetzki, 2014).
In light of the above discussion, I expect cross-country informational linkages to be important
for the European banks’ sovereign exposures both at home and abroad. Figure 3.4 pictures
the bank branch network in 30 EEA countries and it seems that Eurozone crisis struck the
countries located in the outer sphere of this network, which may have caused these sovereigns to
be especially susceptible to informational frictions. Additionally, larger nodes in crisis countries
imply that their banking sector is dominated by the domestic banks which might be the reason
why debt flew back to these countries in large quantities. Figure 3.5 with bank merger network
tells more or less the same story. Hence, I go on to formally estimate the effect of informational
distance on European banks’ behaviour towards crisis countries:
SovereignPortionl,b,c,t = β1(CrossCountryDistancel,c × Crisisc,t)
+ θb,t + γc,t + µl,c + εl,b,c,t (3.5)
where, in addition to the previous ones, I also include fixed effects at the level of interac-
tion between home country and exposure country (µl,c) so that all non-time-varying struc-
tural cross-country linkages could be implicitly controlled. Hence, CrossCountryDistancel,c
only enters the regression in interaction. Alternatively, I use CrossCountryBranchesl,c and
CrossCountryMergersl,c as proxies that would capture the informational channel between
countries.
Table 3.7 presents the effects of informational distance on banks’ exposures to crisis countries.
First thing to notice is that the explanatory power (adjusted-r-square) of the model massively
increases due to the fixed effects at HomeCountry*ExposureCountry level, implying that cross-
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country linkages matter substantially for the European banks’ sovereign portfolios. Although
geography could be thought of as a noisy proxy for informational linkages across countries,27
especially in Europe given the fully open borders and easy transportation, columns I and IV
illustrate that physical distance has a significant negative effect on bank exposures in times
of crisis. One standard deviation increase in distance (0.83) lowers a bank’s sovereign portion
holding of a crisis country by almost one percent. Given that the sample mean of sovereign
portion is 0.012 in the full sample, the effect is quite sizeable and economically meaningful.
Similarly, branch and merger connections, which are better proxies for information, are also
significant and positively associated with the banks’ exposures to crisis countries (see columns
II-III-V-VI).
However, full sample in these estimations also contain domestic observations, which are highly
correlated with information variables; and thus may bias the results if there is a moral suasion or
secondary market effect in these domestic observations. Thus, I take a much more conservative
approach and drop all the domestic observations from the sample. All remaining observations
denote the foreign exposures of the banks. Notice that this is a very conservative approach in the
sense that the concept of informational linkages that this paper has argued for so far has mostly
emphasised the link between governments and their domestic banks. Furthermore, there is the
possibility of “reverse moral suasion” on foreign banks, in which the national regulators may
have forced their banks to specifically drop their exposures to the troubled countries (Ongena
et al., 2016). In that case, such pressure would be most pronounced for better-connected banks
which, even before the crisis, may have had higher exposures to crisis countries. Thus, focusing
only on foreign bank observations would severely underestimate the importance of information
channel during crisis.
With the above concerns in mind, columns VII-XII in Table 3.7 report the results for foreign-
banks sample and show that the effect of geographical distance becomes statistically indistin-
guishable from zero, which is not surprising given the noisy nature of this proxy. On the other
hand, branch and merger variables are still influential on the behaviour of foreign banks towards
27One could also think that distance should be positively associated with asset holdings since more distant
countries would offer better diversification benefits due to the lower correlation in business cycles across countries
(Portes & Rey, 2005).
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crisis countries. Although standard errors get relatively larger in the subsample, magnitude of
the coefficients goes up in the meantime. One standard deviation increase in CrossCountry-
Branches (1.86) shoots up the sovereign portion by more than 1 percent, which is sizeable given
the sample average of 1.2 percent for SovereignPortion. Corresponding one-standard-deviation
effect for the CrossCountryMergers variable is around 0.8 percent, still sizeable but lower than
the one for branches. These findings confirm the main prediction of this paper: European banks
located informationally-closer to troubled countries have relatively increased their exposures to
these sovereigns during Eurozone crisis.
One potentially confounding factor might be the possibility that countries struck by crises may
also be better connected to each other. In such a case, information variables may capture
the effect of risk-shifting which was documented in Table 3.4. To control for this possibility,
I include StressedBank*Crisis interaction as an additional control in Equation 3.5. Table 3.8
updates the results with this extra “risk-shifting” control and it turns out to be significant only
in the full sample. Furthermore, none of the previous findings regarding information effects
change in any meaningful way.
A further criticism might be due to Brutti & Saure´ (2016) who argue that political strength of
the bank’s home country might be important for sovereign debt reallocation. Since banks from
politically influential countries may feel more confident about enforcing repayments, they may
tend to buy foreign government bonds while others are selling. If large and politically strong
Eurozone countries have also banking systems closely-connnected to the troubled countries,
then I might simply be capturing this political strength effect rather than the informational-
closeness. To incorporate this into my framework, I construct two alternative control variables
that Brutti & Saure´ (2016) propose as a measure of political strength. One is the share of total
Eurozone GDP that the home country of the bank produces, namely Eurosharel; and second
is simply a dummy for the German banks, GermanBankl, since Germany has been arguably
the most important decision-maker in Eurozone debt renegotiations so far.
Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 report the results with these two variables in addition to the previous
control for risk-shifting. It is clearly evident from both tables that the effect of information
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variables does not depend on these alternative channels and robust to controlling for them in
various ways. When it comes to individual controls, they usually have positive coefficients as
expected; however there is no statistical evidence that either risk-shifting or political strength
was instrumental in the sovereign exposures of foreign banks in Europe. Overall, independent
of alternative explanations, findings in this section constitute a direct and strong evidence for
the view that information channel played a key role in the recent sovereign debt reallocation
across Europe.
3.4.6 Further analysis and policy implications
Eurozone crisis has been characterized by sudden changes in periphery countries’ bond prices
and various policy responses in the face of rising market speculation. Especially the actions
taken by European Central Bank (ECB) seem to have been instrumental in preventing the self-
fulfilling market sentiments (Saka et al., 2015). It is also possible to argue that cheap financing
provided by the ECB to commercial banks in the form of long term refinancing operations
(LTROs) may have led some of these banks to increase their exposures to risky government
bonds. Given that periphery country banks were more likely to be undercapitalised, this might
be the reason behind the rising domestic exposures of those banks to their own governments.
However, this logic skips the fact that there were various countries in crisis at the same period
and cheap financing together with risk-shifting tendency would lead these banks to also increase
their exposures to other crisis-countries, for which I find only weak evidence in my data and
show that information channel is independent of such motives.
One further extension of empirical strategy could be to check whether previous results might
be driven by real exchange rate risk. Since my sample includes banks located in non-Eurozone
countries such as HSBC in United Kingdom or Danske Bank in Denmark, differences in banks’
currency exposures may affect their hedging strategies via government bonds. To account for
this scenario, I construct a subsample composed of only banks headquartered in Eurozone
countries. Hence, all banks in this subsample use Euro as the main currency and, given that
inflation differences were minimal across European economies during my sample period, these
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banks should on average face similar real exchange rate risks towards other countries. Ta-
ble 3.A2 updates all of the main results with this subsample. As can be clearly seen, there is
no material change in any of my previous findings.
Despite accounting for differences in real exchange rates, one can still argue that there was
a substantial redenomination risk within the Eurozone. As some countries may have started
planning to get out of the monetary union, banks may have optimally started selling government
bonds to hedge against such countries in order to avoid potential currency mismatches after a
Eurozone break-up. However, it is not straightforward to list which countries actually planned
to exit or which countries were perceived by the market as potentially preparing to exit. Thus,
to test whether such motives are important in explaining my results, I follow a strategy similar
to Brutti & Saure´ (2016) and drop from my sample all the bank exposures towards Greece. It
can be easily argued that, if any break-up expectations were evident during the sample period,
this would be especially valid for Greece as it has been the country that suffered the most from
Eurozone crises both economically and politically (Lane, 2012). Therefore, Table 3.A3 presents
the results with Eurozone banks, but this time without any Greek exposures. Again, there does
not seem to be any significant change in my main findings, supporting the notion that they are
not driven substantially by the redenomination risk.
Another robustness check that comes to mind is to test whether the estimations are robust to
reasonable changes in crisis definition. Table 3.A4 and Table 3.A5 present all the main results
with crisis thresholds of 300 and 500 basis points for bond spreads instead of my main definition
of 400bps. All the main results still hold although, expectedly, they get stronger with a lower
threshold as this increases the size of crisis-country observations in the sample and weaker with
a higher threshold as this decreases the number of crisis-countries.28
Furthermore, choosing an arbitrary threshold for crisis dummy restricts the relationship between
information channel and sovereign risk to be non-linear. That is, we assume that information
channel gets activated only at the peak levels of sovereign stress (i.e., crises). However, as men-
tioned earlier, information asymmetry theory of home bias should be applicable for risky assets
28Note that Spain and Italy are never in crisis with the higher threshold of 500bps.
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in more general terms (both in tranquil and stressful times). Hence, one would expect that
even for non-crisis countries, information channel should intensify at relatively higher levels of
sovereign risk. To check for this possibility, I get rid of the crisis dummy and instead directly
use bond spreads in my estimations. Results are illustrated in Table 3.A6 and strongly support
the latter assumption: two-way interaction of CrossCountryBranches*ExpSpread is statistically
significant at 1 percent level in foreign-bank sample with any combination of controls. This ob-
servation supports the intuition that information matters even for the tranquil countries/times
and informationally-closer foreign banks absorb more of the sovereign debt as the default risk
of a country rises in general. On the other hand, previous literature states that bond spreads
may be influenced by factors other than the default risk, such as market liquidity or inflation
expectations. Hence, a less noisy proxy for the true default probability of the government could
be CDS spreads which are less likely to be affected by such contract-specific or market-specific
factors (Longstaff et al., 2011). Therefore, in Table 3.A7, I repeat the same exercise by replac-
ing bond spreads with CDS rates. All previous predictions, especially the ones on information
channel, are again confirmed and leave no doubt behind regarding the general role information
plays at higher levels sovereign risk.
These findings clearly challenge the recent literature of Eurozone studies focusing on the rising
home bias in sovereign debt. One might argue that, in the age of technology and well-integrated
markets such as in Europe, information must be cheap to attain; so huge asymmetries in the
markets should not arise. However, theoretical literature illustrates that even initially-small
differences in informational standings of domestic and foreign agents may lead them to focus
on these differences rather than spending effort to get the information related to foreign assets
(Van Nieuwerburgh & Veldkamp, 2009). Furthermore, recent studies on the sovereign credit
risk prices in the Eurozone provide evidence that, at the peak of the crisis, there were great
discrepancies between bond yields (or CDS spreads) and macro fundamentals of the countries in
the Euro periphery, which is interpreted as a sign of market panic (De Grauwe & Ji, 2013; Saka
et al., 2015). In such circumstances, it is not unreasonable to expect domestic or government-
related banks to benefit from their superior informational position and collect sovereign bonds
while foreign banks were leaving the debt markets in rush. In fact, some studies already show
78
3.4. Methodology & Results
that banks that loaded up periphery country bonds during crisis benefited from this as the
crisis pressures eased (Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, & Hirsch, 2016b).
Another counter-argument might be that part of the literature shows how increasing sovereign
exposures had negative spillovers on European banks’ private lending, which may signal that
sovereign exposure behaviour was partly involuntary for these banks (Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger,
& Hirsch, 2016a; Altavilla et al., 2016b; Popov & Van Horen, 2015). Still, Broner, Erce,
Martin, & Ventura (2014) clearly illustrate that, in the existence of frictions in financial markets,
sovereign exposures may crowd out private lending without necessarily implying an involuntary
or forced behaviour on the part of banks. Additionally, some recent studies that argue in favour
of moral suasion do not find any negative effect of sovereign exposures on private lending
(Ongena et al., 2016).
As a key policy conclusion: if information channel gets active between governments and domes-
tic banks in the midst of a crisis, this may be considered as a stabilizing force compared to a
situation where even domestic banks would rush out of the market and governments would find
it impossible to roll-over their debt. Therefore, the close link between governments and their
domestic banks may create positive externalities in terms of mitigating the effects of sudden
stops and preventing possibly inefficient sovereign defaults. Nevertheless, policy discussions
have so far emphasised shifting the regulatory power from national to supranational institu-
tions to avoid moral suasion or coming up with various innovations of debt issuance in order
to cut off the diabolic loop between sovereigns and their banks (see Brunnermeier, Garicano,
Lane, Pagano, Reis, Santos, Thesmar, Van Nieuwerburgh, & Vayanos, 2016). Taken at face
value, my results imply that these precautions would not be sufficient to prevent the rising home
bias problem (to the extent that it constitutes a problem) during crises. Instead further policy
discussions may also focus on increasing transparency in the sovereign debt markets especially
in times of crisis or encouraging more cross-border banking activities to improve informational
ties across countries.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
Deviating from the growing literature on home bias in European banks’ sovereign debt portfo-
lios, this paper argues that recent rise in this bias is not a surprising phenomenon if one takes
into account one of the most conventional (albeit lately-forgotten) theories of the home bias in
asset markets: informational asymmetries.
By taking a global portfolio approach and using a novel bank-level dataset compiled from
various stress-tests, transparency and capital exercises of the European Banking Authority
(EBA), I show that home bias increased and sovereign debt was indeed reallocated from foreign
to domestic banks at the peak of the crisis. Though it cannot fully explain the rising home bias
in response to crisis, risk-shifting tendency of crisis-country banks seems to have a contribution.
In contrast with the secondary market theory of sovereign home bias, this reallocation was not
visible at all for the domestic agents other than banks, which is not incompatible with the
information channel of this paper given the relative advantages that banks enjoy in government
bond markets. Additionally, I demonstrate that, in response to crisis, private forms of debt
(retail and corporate) in bank balance sheets have experienced an equally large (if not larger)
jump in home bias than the one observed for public debt, which is slightly at odds with the
moral suasion story unless one assumes that government’s priority for moral suasion would be
on private sector debt during a sovereign debt crisis. On the other hand, this finding is what
one would expect from less transparent assets (such as private debt) if crisis episodes were
associated with informational frictions. Finally, I present a direct information channel and
demonstrate that foreign banks that are informationally better-linked to crisis countries have
relatively increased their exposures during crisis. This effect is independent of the previous
channels proposed in the literature, not driven by exchange rate or redenomination risk and
more strongly exists in general terms rather than being specific to the episodes of extreme
sovereign stress. Hence, this paper mainly contributes to the extant empirical literature on
the role informational asymmetries play in asset markets and extends it to the context of
government bonds and high risk periods.
Taken at face value, my results have direct implications for policymakers. To the extent that
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information was at play during recent crises, increasing home bias in bank portfolios may have
been a stabilising force rather than a destabilising one. Despite the well-illustrated adverse
mechanism between governments and banks, the possibility that domestic banks acted as a
buyer of last resort may have helped many of the crisis-governments to continue borrowing
from the market and service their maturing debt payments. In the absence of a national
central bank acting as a lender of last resort, this may have mitigated the sharp effects of a
sudden stop triggered by foreign banks who potentially had very little soft information about
the default probability of the governments. In that case, future policy discussions may benefit
from focusing on increasing transparency in the sovereign debt market and encouraging cross-
border banking activities to mitigate the rising home bias in advance of the next Eurozone
crisis.
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Figure 3.1: Home bias in core and periphery Euro countries during crisis. The graph
shows simple country averages of home bias and bond spreads for each country group (core
vs. periphery). Home Bias is defined as the portion of the total sovereign debt of a country
held by its domestic banks. Bond Spreads are computed as the average daily bond spreads for
a country (with respect to Germany) over the 3-month period before each observation date.
Sovereign bond exposure data come from various stress-tests, transparency and recapitalization
exercises undertaken by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and include 10 observation
dates from 2010-Quarter1 to 2015-Quarter2 (see Table 3.1). Bond yields are obtained from
Datastream. Core (non-crisis) countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and
Netherlands. Periphery (crisis) countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
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Figure 3.2: Home bias (CAPM-adjusted) in core and periphery Euro countries dur-
ing crisis. The graph shows simple country averages of home bias and bond spreads for each
country group (core vs. periphery). Home Bias is defined as the portion of the total sovereign
debt of a country held by its domestic banks, after taking into account the portfolio size of
these domestic banks according to a standard portfolio (CAPM) model (see the Data Descrip-
tion section). Bond Spreads are computed as the average daily bond spreads for a country
(with respect to Germany) over the 3-month period before each observation date. Sovereign
bond exposure data come from various stress-tests, transparency and recapitalization exercises
undertaken by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and include 10 observation dates from
2010-Quarter1 to 2015-Quarter2 (see Table 3.1). Bond yields are obtained from Datastream.
Core (non-crisis) countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands.
Periphery (crisis) countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
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(a) Bank residents and Non-bank residents
(b) Non-residents
Figure 3.3: Home bias for bank residents, non-bank residents and non-residents
during crisis. The graph shows simple country averages of home bias separately for bank
residents, non-bank residents and non-residents. Home Bias is defined as the portion of the total
sovereign debt of a country held by a particular creditor group. Sovereign debt exposures come
from the dataset compiled from various national sources by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012)
and include quarterly observations from 2005-Quarter1 to 2015-Quarter2. Core (non-crisis)
countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands. Periphery (crisis) countries:
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain. Data for Belgium and Finland can only be found
annually; so these data are linearly interpolated in order to obtain quarterly values.
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Figure 3.4: Bank branch network across European countries. The graph shows a simple
network map for all the bank branch connections across 30 EEA countries. Crisis countries
(Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Slovenia and Spain) are in red and others are in
blue. Each arrow represents a connection between two countries with the direction of the
arrow pointing from home country towards the host. Nodes are placed via multidimensional
scaling procedure with a random component and the size of the nodes (own ratio) represents
the percentage of the total branches in a country that belongs to domestic banks. Bank branch
data come from SNL Financial as of February, 2016.
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Figure 3.5: Bank merger network across European countries. The graph shows a simple
network map for all the bank merger connections across 30 EEA countries. Crisis countries
(Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Slovenia and Spain) are in red and others are in
blue. Each arrow represents a connection between two countries with the direction of the
arrow pointing from home country towards the host. Nodes are placed via multidimensional
scaling procedure with a random component and the size of the nodes (own ratio) represents
the percentage of the total mergers in a country that belongs to domestic banks. Bank merger
data come from SDC Platinum and cover the years between 1985 and 2008.
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Table 3.3: Sovereign debt reallocation across European banks during crisis. The table
summarizes the results of the equation (3.1) with dependent variables SovereignPortion (I-IV)
and SovereignPortionBias (V-VIII) estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone
crisis on a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. SovereignPortion is the portion of the
total bank-debt of a sovereign held by a specific bank. SovereignPortionBias is the portion of
total bank-debt of a sovereign held by a specific bank, after adjusting for a standard CAPM
model (see the Data Description section). Domestic is a dummy variable equal to 1 only if
the country of exposure is the same as the home country of the bank. Crisis is a dummy
variable which is equal to 1 only if a Euro country’s bond spread (with respect to Germany) is
above 400 basis points calculated as the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period
preceding the observation date. Sovereign bond holding data come from various exercises of the
European Banking Authority (EBA) and country exposures are included for 30 members of the
European Economic Area (EEA). Bond yields for Crisis dummy are obtained from Datastream.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in brackets.
∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.4: Sovereign debt reallocation across European banks during crisis: Stressed
Banks. The table summarizes the results of the equation (3.2) estimated over a time period
fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. Dependent
variables are SovereignPortion (I-II), which is the portion of the total sovereign debt of a
country held by a specific bank, and SovereignPortionBias (III-IV), which is the portion of
total sovereign debt of a country held by a specific bank after adjusting for a standard CAPM
model (see the Data Description section). Domestic is a dummy variable equal to 1 only if the
country of exposure is the same as the home country of the bank. Crisis is a dummy variable
which is equal to 1 only if a Euro country’s bond spread (with respect to Germany) is above 400
basis points calculated as the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period preceding
the observation date. StressedBank is a dummy variable indicating those observations in which
the home country of the bank is considered to be “in crisis” (400bps ≤ spread). Sovereign
bond holding data come from various exercises of the European Banking Authority (EBA) and
country exposures are included for 30 members of the European Economic Area (EEA). Bond
yields for Crisis dummy are obtained from Datastream. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.5: Sovereign debt reallocation during crisis: Resident banks vs non-bank
residents. The table summarizes the results of the equation (3.3) with dependent variable
DomesticPortion (I-IV), which is the portion of the overall sovereign debt of a country held
by a particular domestic agent (either by resident banks or other private residents), estimated
over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a quarterly basis from early 2010
to the mid-2015. ResidentBanks is a dummy variable equal to one only if the creditor is
the resident banks of the country. Crisis is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 only if a
Euro country’s bond spread (with respect to Germany) is above 400 basis points calculated
as the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period preceding the observation date.
Domestic sovereign holding data come from the dataset compiled from various national sources
by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012). Countries include Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom. Bond yields for
Crisis dummy are obtained from Datastream. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
country-level and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.A2: Main results with only Eurozone banks. The table summarizes the results
of the equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) with dependent variable SovereignPortion
estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a biannual basis from
early 2010 to mid-2015. This sample only includes the banks located in the Eurozone. For
the definitions of variables, see Table 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. Robust standard
errors are clustered and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.A3: Main results with only Eurozone banks and without Greek exposures.
The table summarizes the results of the equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) with
dependent variable SovereignPortion estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone
crisis on a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. This sample only includes the banks
located in the Eurozone and does not include their Greek exposures. For the definitions of
variables, see Table 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. Robust standard errors are clustered
and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.A4: Main results with the crisis threshold of 300 basis points. The table
summarizes the results of the equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) with dependent
variable SovereignPortion estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a
biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. In this sample, Crisis is a dummy variable which
is equal to 1 only if a Euro country’s bond spread (with respect to Germany) is above 300
basis points calculated as the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period preceding
the observation date. For the definitions of variables, see Table 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8,
3.9 and 3.10. Robust standard errors are clustered and t-statistics are reported in brackets.
∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.A5: Main results with the crisis threshold of 500 basis points. The table
summarizes the results of the equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) with dependent
variable SovereignPortion estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a
biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. In this sample, Crisis is a dummy variable which
is equal to 1 only if a Euro country’s bond spread (with respect to Germany) is above 500
basis points calculated as the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period preceding
the observation date. For the definitions of variables, see Table 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8,
3.9 and 3.10. Robust standard errors are clustered and t-statistics are reported in brackets.
∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 3.A6: Main results with the crisis dummy replaced with bond spreads. The
table summarizes the results of the equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) with dependent
variable SovereignPortion estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on
a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. In this sample, Crisis dummy is replaced
with ExpSpread measuring the average of exposure country’s daily bond spreads (with respect
to Germany) over the 3-month period preceding the observation date. For the definitions of
variables, see Table 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. Robust standard errors are clustered
and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
102
3.5. Concluding Remarks
Table 3.A7: Main results with the crisis dummy replaced with CDS spreads. The
table summarizes the results of the equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) with dependent
variable SovereignPortion estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on
a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. In this sample, Crisis dummy is replaced with
ExpSpread measuring the average of exposure country’s daily CDS spreads over the 3-month
period preceding the observation date. For the definitions of variables, see Table 3.3, 3.4, 3.5,
3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. Robust standard errors are clustered and t-statistics are reported in
brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Political Lending Cycles and Real
Outcomes: Evidence from Turkey
4.1 Introduction
Theories of political lending cycles predict that governments use loans by state-owned banks
as a strategic tool for re-election purposes. In particular, bank credit can be significantly
reallocated around election years and such targeted redistribution would often be aimed to
shift local election outcomes in favour of the ruling party, or coalition parties in control of
central government. Is it then possible to see that some regions would be favoured and others
get punished on the basis of their attractiveness to politicians? More importantly, does this
reallocation have real effects on the local economy?
We test theories of political cycles in Turkey for the period from 2003 to 2016 using the universe
of bank credit for the country. We collect detailed data on election outcomes, banking activity
for different bank types, and indicators of economic activity all observed at the province level.
Unlike previous literature, we can draw on quarterly data to identify the exact timing of polit-
ically induced lending. Our data also allow us to differentiate between the effects of politically
driven lending on firms and consumers separately.
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We document two main sets of findings. First, we show that state-owned banks engage in
strategic lending around election years when compared with private banks. In contrast to
earlier findings, state-owned banks curb aggregate credit prior to local elections and increase
lending immediately afterwards However, this result is driven by cross-sectional reallocation of
credit between constituencies defined by their political alignment and the degree of electoral
competition. In particular, state bank lending increases in provinces when an incumbent mayor
aligned with the ruling party faces competition from opposition parties. In contrast, closely
contested provinces get relatively less credit from state banks in the run up to elections if the
incumbent mayor is from an opposition party. We interpret this vastly different behaviour of
state banks around elections as strong evidence for the existence of a political lending cycle.
It appears that the central government strategically targets provinces either to support their
own mayors, or to punish opposition mayors, so that their candidates have a better chance in
upcoming elections.
Election cycles and close election outcomes provide a quasi-exogenous variation in how aggre-
gate credit is allocated across the country. In our second set of findings, we present evidence
that local economic activity is influenced by this reallocation. In particular, economic output –
as measured by private sector building activity – suffers in provinces with an opposition mayor
and close electoral competition when compared against provinces with aligned mayors. In line
with the interpretation that this reallocation of economic activity is driven by the political
lending cycle, we find that credit extended to the corporate sector follows the same pattern.
Our identification strategy builds on difference-in-differences estimates that exploit the greater
susceptibility of state-owned banks to political pressure compared with private banks. We
use cross-sectional variation in electoral competition and political alignment across localities
to identify elements of tactical redistribution and rule out alternative explanations. On the
one hand, this helps us eliminate demand-driven explanations of the lending cycle, since local
economic shocks that may be correlated with the election cycle should affect private banks
equally. On the other hand, private banks may also be subject political influence, and they
may respond to competition from state banks. In that case, our estimations constitute a lower
bound for the true size of the political cycle.
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Our setting also allows us to differentiate between some of the main mechanisms of politi-
cal resource reallocation suggested in earlier work. The literature on targeted redistribution
distinguishes between constant patronage, which refers to rewarding core supporters (Cox &
McCubbins, 1986), and tactical redistribution, which aims to achieve electoral gains by target-
ing politically competitive regions around elections (Dixit & Londregan, 1996). “Patronage”
involves awarding areas in which the incumbent party might enjoy strong support. Such con-
stituencies would absorb a disproportionate amount of resources regardless of the electoral cycle.
“Tactical redistribution” predicts that resources will be directed towards ‘swing’ districts either
to change the election outcome, in which case we are more likely to see an impact prior to the
election, or rewarding the party’s strongholds, where one would expect to see a post-election
impact. Our results provide strong evidence consistent with tactical redistribution, while we
also find some evidence supporting the constant patronage argument.
We contribute to two strands of the literature. First, we provide new evidence on political
cycles and mechanisms underlying tactical redistribution. Inspired by theories of opportunistic
political cycles,1 earlier studies investigate the effect of elections on governments’ tax revenues
and budget deficits.2 Evidence shows that such political budget cycles are prevalent across the
world, especially in developing countries and young democracies (Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya,
2004; Shi & Svensson, 2006; Brender & Drazen, 2008). A more recent set of papers asks whether
lending by state-owned banks follows a political cycle. Dinc¸ (2005) finds cross-country evidence
that government-owned banks raise lending in national election years compared with private
banks. Cole (2009) finds that state banks in India extend more agricultural credit during
election years, but with no tangible effect on agricultural output, especially in ‘swing’ regions.3
Similarly, Carvalho (2014) shows that Brazilian firms eligible for state-bank lending employ
more people in politically attractive regions near elections and in return, these expansions are
likely to be financed by state-bank loans. Most recently, Englmaier & Stowasser (2017) find that
1See Nordhaus (1975), MacRae (1977) and Rogoff & Sibert (1988).
2These studies explore the possibility that politicians in power may use the central government’s fiscal
muscles to boost the economy and improve their own re-election prospects. However, there is a chance that
sophisticated voters might punish opportunistic governments as in Peltzman (1992), although this would require
fully-informed voters with plenty of democratic experience (Brender & Drazen, 2005).
3Cole (2009) also finds that loan defaults increase after directed lending with no concurrent rise in output,
which implies that election-induced loans are not used efficiently.
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German savings banks, which are subject to political influence, change their lending behaviour
in the run up to local elections.
Our work complements these studies. We take advantage of the Turkish electoral system, which
differentiates between the election of district and metropolitan mayors, to create an exact match
between political, credit, and real outcomes at the province level. Our identification is strongest
in metropolitan provinces where a single mayor is elected by the majority of votes coming from
all voters located in that province. This helps us derive more precise estimates for political
competition and avoid vote aggregation issues encountered by earlier studies. Furthermore, we
draw on a newly available quarterly dataset of bank loans to explore the lending cycle in a higher
frequency and differentiate between pre- and post-election behaviour. This is a considerable
improvement over previous studies, which analyse lending cycles using yearly observations that
do not always correspond to exact election timing.
In terms of mechanisms, our setting is similar to the political capture mechanism described
by Brollo & Nannicini (2012) and Carvalho (2014) for Brazil, where state-bank lending is
controlled by the central government and reallocated among regions depending on their political
attractiveness. We provide evidence that state-bank loans are reallocated towards politically
competitive provinces when the incumbent mayor is allied with the ruling party in central
government. However, in opposition provinces, this reallocation takes the form of punishment,
as credit is withdrawn especially from competitive regions. Our findings suggest that the latter
mechanism outweighs the former. Our evidence is therefore consistent with the incentives of
“tying your enemy’s hands in close races” (Brollo & Nannicini, 2012).
Our second contribution to the literature is on potential benefits and harms of state-owned
banks. While government ownership can help solve credit market failures that arise due to
coordination problems or information asymmetries (Stiglitz, 1993), they could also end up
serving the private interests of the politicians (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998). In a
seminal paper, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, & Shleifer (2002) show that state ownership of the
banking sector across countries is associated with lower levels of growth, financial development,
and government efficiency. Sapienza (2004) uses loan-level data to find that Italian state banks
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charge lower interest rates to similar firms. This tendency strengthens as the political party
associated with the state bank has more support in the region, implying financial favours for
its supporters. Similarly, Khwaja & Mian (2005) present evidence that firms in Pakistan with
a politician on their board benefit from lower rates and default more often when they borrow
from government banks, but not from private ones.4
Our paper contributes to this literature by showing that the political lending cycle in Turkey
is driven mainly by corporate sector loans, implying that the government prefers enriching the
(potentially connected) firms operating in allied regions while impoverishing the ones located
on the opposition side. Since such reallocation has real economic effects in the same locality,
this could lead to an increase in inequality among provinces of different political affiliations.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly outlines the Turkish
banking industry and gives the institutional background for local elections in Turkey. Section 3
describes the data. Our empirical methodology and results are presented in section 4. Section
5 concludes.
4.2 Institutional Background
4.2.1 The Turkish banking sector
The Turkish financial system is dominated by deposit-taking banks, which are the primary
sources of funding in the economy as in other emerging markets. Both state-owned and private
banks provide banking services through nation-wide branch networks, and there are no local or
regional banks. Banks primarily lend to corporates and households with no particular sectoral
specialisation, having left behind the episode of fiscal repression and funding government deficits
of the 1980’s and 1990’s.
The shift in Turkish banking activity toward private sector financing followed an intensive
4See also Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee (2006), who detect a negative relationship between political connectedness
of Indonesian firms and their foreign financing; this is consistent with the view that connected firms can obtain
cheap financing from government banks and do not benefit from foreign financing.
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restructuring phase, which was instigated by the twin currency and banking crises that struck
the country between 1999 and 2001.5 More than 15 banks failed during the episode and
many were taken over by the country’s Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). An extensive
reform package was initiated under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
strengthen the operational efficiency and financial stability of the banking sector. The central
bank gained its institutional independence by law, while an independent Banking Regulation
and Supervision Agency (BRSA) was established to solve the conflict of interest problem in
bank supervision.6 The BRSA was also given the sole right to issue new banking permits,
which had been at the hands of the central government’s Council of Ministers and therefore
heavily politicised. In early 2003, BRSA pushed through the early adoption of Basel II capital
adequacy standards. In 2004, a limited deposit insurance scheme was introduced and replaced
the previously unlimited coverage for all financial institutions.
These reforms have undeniably improved the institutional quality of the Turkish banking sector,
which escaped the global financial crisis of 2008-09 unscathed. They also arguably minimised
government interference in banking, except via direct ownership. State authorities retain con-
trolling shares in all three deposit-taking state banks – Ziraatbank, Halkbank, and Vakifbank –,
while they have no direct influence over private banks. Therefore, our sample period, which
starts around the time that these reforms took effect, constitutes an ideal period to investigate
the influence of the central government on state-owned banks. Even though such influence has
always existed in the Turkish political sphere, we expect the ownership to be the only channel
through which government may exert pressure on the banking system during the period under
study.7
Table 4.1 shows how deposit-taking banks in Turkey have evolved over the past two decades.8
5One of the root causes of these crises was the heavy involvement of the banks in the domestic government
debt market, which has since receded. For a detailed discussion, see Akyu¨z & Boratav (2003).
6Up until 2000, the Treasury and the Central Bank shared the responsibility for bank supervision. These
institutions were not able to step in to prevent the excessive carry-trade tendency when weakly-capitalised
banks started financing Turkish government debt with cheap borrowing from abroad and exposed themselves
to massive currency risks (see Baum, Caglayan, & Talavera, 2010).
7In the coalition governments of 1990s, for instance, it was common practice to share control of state banks
among coalition parties based on their vote shares (O¨nder & O¨zyıldırım, 2013).
8Note that information in Table 4.1 does not include investment banks, development banks, or banks under
the management of SDIF.
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Panel A indicates that the sector has shrunk in size considerably between 1999 and 2004
following the financial stability programme. In total 20 banks were closed down, while state
banks became much leaner by shedding branches and personnel. However, both state and
private banks flourished since then, expanding their branch network and employees considerably.
The sector consolidated on the private side through entry or mergers involving new and foreign
banks. The three state banks were initially aimed to be privatised as part of the post-crisis
restructuring programme, but these plans were never put into practice by the government.
Panel B shows that the formation of a uniform supervisory and regulatory system levelled the
playing field for private and state banks. State banks have substantially improved their loan
quality and capital buffers since 2004. More importantly, private and state banks have con-
verged to a similar level of financial performance over time. This ensures that our identification
strategy is immune to operational differences or balance sheet effects between these two sets
of banks. State and private deposit-taking banks have typically controlled 30% and 60% of
total banking assets, respectively. Their shares in total deposits and lending have been similar.
Banking sector in general has experienced a strong growth, nearly doubling its size with respect
to country’s GDP since 2004.9
4.2.2 Politics and local elections in Turkey
Turkey is a parliamentary democracy with a multi-party political system. The Prime Minister,
typically the leader of a political coalition, serves as the head of government and exercises
executive powers with the Council of Ministers. The current ruling party, AKP (Adalet ve
Kalkinma Partisi), has been in power since 2002 and retained its majority of seats in parliament
through several general elections. The AKP inherited the IMF-led reforms of 1999-2001 and
successfully implemented them, bringing public expenditures under control, strengthening the
overall quality of institutions, and starting accession negotiations with the European Union in
2005.10
9See Table 4.A1 for the growth in assets, loans and deposit activity separately for state and private banks
since 1999.
10See Acemoglu & Ucer (2015) for a discussion of Turkish politics and institutions under the AKP rule.
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Turkey is divided into 81 provinces (or cities) for administrative purposes, which are further
divided into 923 districts. Each district corresponds to a constituency in a local election. Out of
the 81 provinces, 30 are designated as metropolitan municipalities. A metropolitan municipality
consists of all districts within the borders of that province, and a metropolitan mayor is elected
by the majority of votes cast in that province.11 The electorate in metropolitan areas also votes
for district mayors on the same election day. Voters in non-metropolitan areas only vote for
mayoral candidates of the district they live in. The major contest among political parties is to
have their candidate elected as the metropolitan mayor in metropolitan provinces, and as the
mayor of the central district in the remaining provinces.
Local elections are held every five years on the same day throughout the country. Our sample
period covers three local elections held in 2004, 2009, and 2014, at the end of March in each
case. On the one hand, this means that we cannot exploit time variation across provinces in
elections. On the other hand, it removes any bias from endogeneity of election timing, which
may arise if early elections are called when the local economy is doing particularly well (Cole,
2009). Although early local elections are possible de jure in Turkey, de facto they do not exist
in the country’s political culture.12 We focus on political cycles based on local, as opposed to
general, elections to identify possible effects on bank lending and economic outcomes.13 The
reasons for this are twofold.
First, as Turkey gradually shifted from coalition governments to single-party governments over
the past two decades, local elections have become more instrumental in expanding the power
base of the ruling party. Mayors have become more visible in national politics, and some
metropolitan municipalities have commanded substantial political clout.14 These developments
are consistent with the political model of Brollo & Nannicini (2012), in which voters are un-
able to distinguish the sources of government transfers and political spillovers occur in favour
11As discussed later, this helps us have a better correspondence between election and credit data in metropoli-
tan provinces.
12There has never been an early local election in Turkey since 1982.
13General elections are held in different years from local elections, and frequently called early by the central
government opportunistically. There were four national elections in our sample period: 2007, 2011, 2015 (June),
and 2015 (November).
14Indeed, current President Recep T. Erdogan served as mayor of Istanbul between 1994 and 1998, before
he set up the AKP that has ruled the country since 2002. See I˙nciog˘lu (2002) and Sayarı (2014) for the rising
importance of local elections in Turkey.
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of municipal governments. The central government may then use transfers to favour political
friends or to punish political enemies at the local level, since mayoral candidates can be im-
portant allies for the central government once elected (Brollo & Nannicini, 2012). In addition,
the single-party AKP government has rarely faced any competition at national elections during
our sample period. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that any potential reallocation of resources
should follow local elections, especially where the ruling party in central government faces real
competition to ”win” or ”lose” certain provinces.
Second, province-level vote shares of political parties at national elections do not translate
directly into the number of seats gained in parliament, and thereby into political influence over
resource transfers. This is due to the presence of a relatively high election threshold, which
requires each political party to receive at least 10% of the national vote to enter the parliament.
This makes it impossible to have a clear measure of the actual province-level electoral contest,
since votes for parties that fail to clear the national threshold are redistributed among remaining
parties in each province. The number of legislators that go to parties with at least 10% of the
national vote are artificially increased as a result. We believe that such uncertainty regarding the
number of legislative seats that can be won at the province level deters the central government
from pursuing a regional targeting policy.15 In contrast, competition in a local election is
straightforward to quantify and more visible as it resembles to a single-winner voting system,
in which the party that gets the most votes wins the constituency. Therefore, our focus on local
elections helps us understand tactical reallocation by the central government when it faces a
clear competitive threat to win or lose a region.
4.3 Data
There are three main data sets that we exploit in our analysis. Our first dataset combines
various sources with detailed banking information. We use annual bank credit data provided
15Baum et al., 2010 check for parliamentary election cycles in the Turkish banking sector from 1963 to 2007
and find no evidence of a meaningful difference between state and private banks. This could be due to two
possible reasons. Either governments do not resort to such tactics for general elections, or political influence
also affects private banks, as it used to be the case before 2001.
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by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) and the Banks Association of Turkey
(BAT). We combine these two datasets and eliminate the pre-crisis era, focusing instead on the
period characterised by the single-party government. This gives us the year-end total cash loan
exposure of each bank type (state or private) in each of Turkey’s 81 provinces from 2003 to 2016.
Additionally, we benefit from the FinTu¨rk database maintained by the Banking Regulatory and
Supervisory Agency (BRSA). BRSA provides quarterly province-level data on credit extended
by state and private banks since the fourth quarter of 2007. These data constitute the universe
of bank cash and non-cash loans in the country, and they are further broken down by credit
extended to different sectors (e.g. corporate vs consumer). They cover 81 provinces over 37
quarters for different bank types, which gives us the opportunity to employ higher frequency
data around elections and differentiate between pre- and post-election effects. In addition, we
collect quarterly data on bank branches from FinTu¨rk, again at the level of province and bank
type.
Our second dataset contains measures of real economic outcomes. Since Turkey provides eco-
nomic indicators typically at a more aggregate subregional level, we resort to a different proxy
for economic activity at the province level.16 In particular, we obtain records of construction
permits issued by local municipalities from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). These
permits are a standard requirement for any entity to start a construction project. We believe
that new construction activity in a province provides a good proxy for local economic activity.
We obtain information on all buildings constructed in each province between 2003 and 2016,
including total number of flats and houses, square-meters covered, and monetary value (in
Turkish Liras). These data are also broken down by ownership (private vs public sector); we
only keep private sector construction in our sample to avoid the possibility that state-funded
projects might be targeted independent of credit conditions.17
Our third data set consists of local election outcomes. We obtain information on district- and
metropolitan-level votes for each political party from TurkStat. Based on these data, we create
16Turkey follows EuroStat’s NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) designation for regions.
There are 81 provinces at the NUTS-3 level, 26 subregions at the NUTS-2 level, and 12 regions at the NUTS-1
level.
17Marschall, Aydogan, & Bulut (2016) provide evidence consistent with the view that government-funded
building projects in Turkey might be politically motivated.
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two political variables. The first is a measure of political competition (or contestedness) that
captures the margin of victory/loss by the ruling-party (AKP) candidate against the most
popular opposition (non-AKP) candidate. Formally, we construct the following Competition
variable:
Competitionp,t = 1− |WinMarginp,t|
where p stands for province, t indicates the particular election and WinMargin denotes the
difference in the share of votes won by the ruling party’s candidate and the most popular
opposition candidate. Thus, Competition takes values between 0 and 1, with values closer
to 1 indicating close electoral competition. For instance, in the extreme case that the top
two candidates get the exact same share of votes (which is never observed in our sample),
Competition would equal 1. To capture province-level competition, we work with the win
margin in the election of metropolitan mayors in metropolitan areas. For non-metropolitan
areas, we use the corresponding value for the central district of the province.
Our second political variable is a dummy for political alignment (or incumbency), which indi-
cates whether the ruling-party (AKP) candidate wins (i.e., gets the highest number of votes)
in that province or not. Recall that voters elect both district and metropolitan mayors in
metropolitan provinces, while they elect only a district mayor in non-metropolitan provinces.
However, our credit data are only available at the province level, which means we need to
aggregate voting outcomes to define a province-level measure of alignment. Previous literature
deals with this problem by averaging voting outcomes across constituencies of a region (see,
for instance, Cole, 2009). However, this approach may be inappropriate in our setting. Un-
like most previous studies, in which political pressure is applied by local governments on local
state banks, our setting predicts political influence by the central government on national state
banks. Thus, tactical reallocation not only depends on electoral competition in a province, but
also crucially on whether the province is currently aligned or not.18 This forces us to have a
cleaner measure of alliance than averaging across districts.
18Alliance with the central or federal government does not matter in the political settings of Sapienza (2004),
Cole (2009) or Englmaier & Stowasser (2017), where locally elected governments have a direct influence on state
banks that operate locally. Carvalho (2014) has a setting similar to ours, in which the central government in
Brazil manipulates state-bank lending to help re-elect allied state governors.
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We tackle this problem by concentrating on the metropolitan mayors and, in non-metropolitan
provinces, on the central district mayors. This gives us a direct measure of alliance for each
province. However, this matching is still not ideal for non-metropolitan provinces, since some
central districts – even though they are the largest by population within a province – do not
always represent the political dynamics of the whole province. This can be seen in Figure 4.1,
which shows the alliance of elected district mayors in two non-metropolitan provinces during
2004 elections. Panel A shows that in Mus¸, the only aligned district was the central district,
where the electorate represented less than half of all voters (48.3%) in that province. In contrast,
the central district in Kastamonu (Panel B) was not aligned with the ruling party; however,
a large portion of the province (43.9% by votes) was still governed by an aligned mayor. If
politically induced lending occurs at the level of districts, this may create some measurement
error and lead to attenuation bias in our estimates. We therefore base our main findings on
results from metropolitan provinces, where the elected mayor represents the whole electorate
and acts as the main political figure in the province.19 Our estimates from the metropolitan
sample should thus be free of measurement error. Nevertheless, we will also report our findings
from a full sample that also includes non-metropolitan provinces.
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for the main variables in our analysis. During our sample
period, 60% of provinces on average are classified as politically aligned with the ruling party.
There is a fair degree of electoral competition, as the win margin in the median province is 14
percentage points.
19Given the rising importance of metropolitan mayors in the Turkish political sphere and their importance in
the overall economy, we also believe that the central government is more likely to strategically target metropoli-
tan provinces.
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4.4 Methodology & Results
4.4.1 Identification strategy
We start with a simple difference-in-differences (DD) methodology in a balanced panel setting
to investigate political cycles. We use government ownership of banks as our ‘treatment’, which
captures political influence by the central government over local lending. Our control group
includes all privately-owned banks that operate in the same provinces. If there is politically
induced lending, then political pressure on state-owned banks should intensify around election
years. We therefore expect state banks to alter their lending behaviour closer to elections
compared with private banks. To the extent that the effect of politicians on lending decisions
by state banks is stable over time, or that politicians might also affect private banks around
elections, our DD estimates provide a lower bound for the true size of politically induced lending.
The essence of DD relies on the premise that treated and untreated groups share a parallel
trend in the absence of treatment (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Figure 4.2 shows the evolution
of total cash loans extended by state and private banks since 2003 (in levels on the left panel
and in logs on the right panel). Aggregate credit has been on a stable trajectory for both
state and private banks throughout this period. Two exceptions to these trends appear in 2009
and 2016, when lending by private banks have actually contracted due to significant slowdown
in the Turkish economy.20 Our DD strategy should be immune to year-specific shocks to the
extent that economic slowdowns affect all provinces or bank types similarly. Nevertheless, we
carry out extensive checks to ensure that no single election or unobserved province- or bank
type-specific shocks drive our results. Moreover, we include the number of local branches by
bank type in each of our regressions. This should help us control for any long-term credit
demand and supply conditions in each province by bank type, and potential sorting of banks
that may be linked to regional unobservables.
As discussed before, we mainly search for tactical redistribution prior to elections in our context
20Turkey experienced a recession in 2009 due to the global financial crisis while growth slowed down in 2016
due to increased uncertainty, heightened by a failed coup attempt in July.
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while still being open to the possibility of patronage in non-election years. To test this idea,
we make use of the full time-series and cross-sectional dimensions of our dataset. Formally,
we adopt a triple difference-in-differences (DDD) model and test whether highly contested
provinces get more/less credit from state banks around elections when compared with private
banks. The DDD model allows us to control for a full set of province-by-year or bank type-
by-year fixed effects. This helps us eliminate any unobserved province- or bank-specific shocks
that may be correlated with election cycles.
Indeed, a key feature of our identification comes from the fact that we test the differential al-
location of state-bank credit towards ‘swing’ provinces over the entire election cycle instead of
only comparing election versus non-election years. This gives us a full picture of the evolution
of political pressure on state-banks, and provides a much more powerful test of election-induced
lending. In fact, bank credit cycles over time could be explained by reasons unrelated to poli-
tics (such as banks’ different sensitivities to political uncertainty). Cross-sectional allocation of
credit towards certain provinces could be related to province-specific factors (such as concen-
tration of certain sectors in certain provinces). However, it is almost impossible to explain why
such cross-sectional relationships would vary over time specifically around elections without
resorting to an explanation based on political incentives (Cole, 2009).
4.4.2 Is there an election cycle in state-bank credit?
We start by testing whether state banks adjust their overall lending behaviour around elections
compared with private banks using a standard DD model. Consider:
LogCreditb,p,t = βτStateBankb × Electiont+τ + δXb,p,t−1 + θb + γp + λt + εb,p,t (4.1)
where b is an index for bank type (state or private), p stands for province, and t denotes years
in the yearly data (CBRT) and year-quarters in the quarterly data (FinTu¨rk). StateBankb
is a dummy variable indicating state-owned banks. Importantly, Electiont equals one in the
year before a local election and zero otherwise. Since all three elections are held in March, this
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strategy ensures that we capture a pre-election rather than a post-election effect in our yearly
regressions.21 To document the full election cycle, we generalise the definition of Electiont to
Electiont+τ and re-run regressions where τ takes values from -2 to +2 indicating the number
of years around elections. For instance, we have τ = 1 to indicate the first year-end after an
election (corresponding to 2004, 2009 and 2014).
Our coefficient of interest in Equation 4.1 is βτ and captures the behaviour of state banks
compared with private banks at each point over the election cycle. We include fixed effects
at the levels of bank type, province, and time in our baseline. Lastly, Xb,p,t−1 includes lagged
number of bank branches, which control for local market shares separately for each bank-type.
We cluster standard errors in all of our regressions at the province level, since local credit
outcomes are likely to be correlated across time within localities.
Table 4.3 presents results on the election year (i.e., τ = 0) for the full sample and the subsample
of metropolitan provinces. In both samples and across different sets of controls, state banks
decrease credit supply with respect to private banks in the run up to local elections.22 This
is the case even when all province-specific and time-varying factors are non-parametrically
controlled (Columns IV and VIII), where all relevant local shocks to credit demand such as
unemployment or growth are absorbed. State bank lending is between 10.3% and 14.2% lower
compared with private-bank lending in election years.
Figure 4.3 shows results for the whole election cycle from regressions that control for local
branches, baseline fixed effects, and province time trends. Each plotted coefficient corresponds
to a single regression with an estimate of βτ when τ is equal to -2, -1, 0, +1 or +2. Hence,
coefficient estimates for τ = 0 in Panels A and B equal estimates reported in Columns III
and VII, respectively, of Table 4.3. The figure shows that state banks start curbing credit
with respect to private banks one year before an election, and they further reduce lending in
an election year. However, they increase lending on a larger scale than private banks directly
afterwards. This cycle seems slightly stronger in metropolitan provinces than in our full sample.
21Note that this approach is also in line with previous literature (Englmaier & Stowasser, 2017).
22Table 4.A2 shows that this result is not driven by a particular local election in our sample period.
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This finding may at first seem counter-intuitive, since most earlier studies document a rise
in state-bank lending in the run up to elections. There are two reasons why earlier findings
and ours actually complement, rather than contradict, each other. First, our focus is on local
election cycles rather than general elections that have been studied by previous literature (Dinc¸,
2005). In local elections, a central government’s control over state banks leads to different
incentives across provinces depending on their political attractiveness (Brollo & Nannicini,
2012; Carvalho, 2014). Therefore, local elections do not necessarily imply an overall pre-election
credit boom in the country. Second, earlier studies that investigate local elections and bank
credit typically have political settings in which local governments are in direct control of local
state banks (Cole, 2009; Englmaier & Stowasser, 2017). In that case, each local government
would have an incentive to encourage pre-election lending to increase their re-election prospects,
and thus there would be an overall credit boom in the country before elections. However,
our political pressure channel goes from central government to state banks, which predicts a
reallocation of credit across provinces but does not necessitate a rise in aggregate lending.
We next zoom in on the whole election cycle and check how lending by state banks evolves
in the quarters immediately up to and after local elections. For this purpose, we estimate
Equation 4.1 with the quarterly data provided by FinTu¨rk over the period between 2007 and
2016, which covers two local elections. Electiont now takes the value of 1 in the first quarters
of 2009 and 2014 as well as in the preceding three quarters (and 0 otherwise).23 Thus, we
can differentiate exactly between pre- and post-election outcomes since the Electiont dummy
covers the four quarters immediately before the election takes place.
Table 4.4 presents the results. In line with our earlier findings from yearly data, state banks
reduce their lending in the four quarters up to and including elections when compared with
private banks. Point estimates range from 6.4% in the full sample to 11.2% in the metropolitan
sample; all coefficients are estimated with a high level of statistical significance across different
sets of controls.
The main advantage of working with quarterly data is that we can pinpoint exactly when state
23Exact election dates are 29 March in 2009 and 30 March in 2014.
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banks alter their lending behaviour. We therefore extend our definition of the election variable
to the whole cycle by employing a rolling definition of Electiont+τ , where τ corresponds to the
quarters before and after elections. For instance, Electiont−2 equals 1 for two to six quarters
prior to the election and 0 otherwise.
Figure 4.4 plots coefficients for the entire credit cycle. Lending by state banks hits rock bottom
compared with private banks either in the quarter in which elections take place or just before.
In metropolitan provinces, state-bank credit hits a trough at -11.4% two quarters before local
elections, while it hits a trough at -6.7% in the election quarter in the full sample. This negative
effect is estimated with precision in the five quarters leading up to the election and persists
for another two to three quarters following it. These findings clearly illustrate that state bank
credit is subject to a cycle around local elections. State banks reduce their lending prior to
local elections and boost it afterwards compared with private banks, especially in metropolitan
provinces.
An important implication of these findings is that low frequency data may not be optimal to
explore electoral cycles in bank lending. This point was first made by Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya
(2004) in the context of political budget cycles. As the use of annual data do not allow a
clear differentiation between pre- and post-election outcomes, studies may misinterpret the
post-election rise in credit as direct evidence of political incentives. For instance, if Electiont
dummy in Equation 4.1 was defined as the actual election year instead of the year before, our
estimates in Table 4.3 would come out as significantly positive.24. However, as can be seen from
Figure 4.3/ 4.4, this would only be a post-election effect, which may not be directly driven by
political motives.25
Although we find evidence that state banks’ lending behaviour changes around elections, it is
important to note that such intertemporal reallocation does not strictly imply political manip-
ulation. It is possible that state banks are more sensitive than private banks to overall political
24Notice that estimates for βτ would then be the same as current estimates for βτ+1 in Figure 4.3.
25In fact, O¨nder & O¨zyıldırım (2013) find that state banks in Turkey increase their share in the credit market
during local elections; the authors use the same yearly dataset as we do but with the definition of ‘actual election
year’ and interpret their findings as a sign of political manipulation. As obvious from the discussion above, such
a conclusion might be biased.
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uncertainty induced by local elections. As a result they may choose to postpone lending deci-
sions until after elections take place. Since we document a recovery in state-bank lending a few
quarters after elections, we do not yet rule out this possibility.
4.4.3 Is there tactical redistribution across provinces?
We now test the existence of political incentives behind the intertemporal reallocation of state-
bank credit over the local election cycle. Note that redistributing credit is not costless and
that the central government’s incentive to distort bank policies increases with the marginal
utility of receiving additional votes (Englmaier & Stowasser, 2017). Undoubtedly, this marginal
utility is highest where a small number of votes can determine the outcome; that is, in closely
contested elections. We should therefore find stronger reallocation of credit in provinces with
high electoral competition if the election-induced cycle is driven (at least partly) by political
goals. To test this idea, we extend Equation 4.1 to a triple difference-in-differences model as
in the following:
LogCreditb,p,t = βτCompp,t × StateBankb × Electiont+τ + α1Compp,t × StateBankb
+ α2StateBankb × Electiont+τ + α3Compp,t × Electiont+τ
+ α4Compp,t + δXb,p,t−1 + θb + γp + λt + εb,p,t (4.2)
where Compp,t represents the Competition variable created in Section 4.3. Notice that Compp,t
is time-varying and we need to make an assumption on political contestedness for non-election
years. We follow the literature in assuming that competition for the next two years after
an election is captured by the previous election outcome, while it is captured by an upcoming
election outcome for the two years before an election in that constituency (Cole, 2009; Englmaier
& Stowasser, 2017). Despite the obvious endogeneity concern between credit as a dependent
variable and competition as an independent variable in Equation 4.2, we believe it is reasonable
to assume that political redistribution of credit would not change election outcomes by such a
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high margin as to make an election uncompetitive.26
Our main coefficient of interest in Equation 4.2 is the triple-interaction effect denoted by βτ .
It captures the impact of rising political competition in a province on the difference between
state-bank and private-bank lending during an election year (i.e., when τ = 0). The two-way
interactions underlying the triple effect absorb economically important effects and are also of
interest. Based on the discussion in Section 4.4.1, α1 accounts for the possibility that state
banks may differ in their local lending behaviour depending on the political attractiveness of
a province independent of an election cycle. Similarly, α2 captures any election-induced effects
that may differ between the two types of banks, while α3 accounts for any responses to elections
that may vary across provinces but not bank types. Hence, the model captures any shocks to
banks or provinces that may be correlated with either the electoral cycle or the degree of
contestedness in an election.
A central government’s incentives to redistribute resources across provinces depends not only
on political attractiveness, but also on whether the incumbent mayor is a political ally or not.
In particular, if a province is currently ruled by a mayor from the ruling party, then the central
government has an interest in increasing voter appreciation and the re-election chances of the
incumbent mayor. However, the opposite would be true if a mayor from opposition is currently
in charge. It is thus optimal from the central government’s perspective to increase credit and
positively influence economic conditions in politically aligned provinces, and to decrease credit
and reduce economic activity in non-aligned provinces. Therefore, we divide our sample into
two subsamples based on current mayoral incumbency and condition our expectations of βτ
on political alliance. If tactical redistribution exists, we expect βτ > 0 in aligned provinces
and βτ < 0 in non-aligned provinces just prior to the elections (τ = 0). As for the constant
patronage argument: central government would ‘normally’ (i.e., in non-election periods) be
expected to favour its strong supporters (less competitive areas) in allied provinces and more
competitive areas in non-allied provinces. Hence, we would expect βτ to switch its sign further
away from elections (for very low or high values of τ).
26This does not mean that the central government would not be able to win an election by manipulating
credit. It means that any extra lending allocated to a province through state banks would not be able to change
the nature of the election, making it competitive or uncompetitive.
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We estimate Equation 4.2 on both our yearly and quarterly data. Table 4.5 shows the yearly
results for metropolitan provinces, where we expect our identification to be strongest (see
Section 4.3). In line with a tactical redistribution mechanism, there is evidence that state
banks lend more in provinces with higher political contestedness and an aligned incumbent
mayor (i.e., βτ > 0 in columns I-V), while they significantly cut credit in provinces with higher
political contestedness but ruled by an opposition mayor (i.e., βτ < 0 in columns VI-X). We
report estimates in each sub-sample with varying degrees of saturation in our fixed effects and
find especially strong results in non-aligned provinces.
Figure 4.5 reports our yearly results for the whole election cycle by plotting the coefficient
estimates of the triple-interaction term (βτ ) for different values of τ .
27 Panel A shows estimates
from metropolitan provinces. In politically aligned provinces, state banks lend more than
private banks in the election year especially when political competition is high, and this effect
persists in the post-election period. In non-aligned provinces, the drop in state-bank lending
in the election year similarly persists one year after the election before recovering. These
findings suggest that the central government may continue its tactical redistribution even after
elections by rewarding constituencies in which it narrowly won, and punishing regions in which
it narrowly lost elections. There is also some support for constant patronage hypothesis as βτ
switches signs when the central government does not have electoral concerns but would rather
favour areas where it faces stronger support in general (τ = −2 and +2). The same patterns
are also observed in Panel B, which shows estimates from the full sample of provinces, although
coefficients have less precision.
It is crucial to differentiate between pre- and post-election effects to understand the exact nature
of the lending cycle. We re-estimate Equation 4.2 with the quarterly data to see the effects
of tactical redistribution in a more granular timeline.28 Table 4.6 shows the corresponding
estimates. In line with our yearly results, politically aligned provinces benefit from a relative
27The exact model used for the estimates shown in the figure includes our baseline controls and Province time
trends as in Columns III and VIII in Table 4.5.
28As noted earlier, our quarterly observations start from the end of 2007 and hence do not cover the first local
election in 2004. However, we do not expect this to be driving our previous results. Indeed, one could predict
a more intense pre-election manipulation in the last two local elections since they correspond to a later period
in which the ruling party has consolidated its control over government institutions.
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rise in credit supply by state banks when elections are closely contested, while non-aligned
provinces suffer from a relative reduction. Estimates are statistically significant for non-aligned
provinces and comparable to those reported in Table 4.5. A one standard-deviation rise in the
competitiveness of an opposition province leads to a decline of almost 6% in state-bank loans on
the election year compared with private banks. This effect is quite sizeable given that our credit
measure covers the entire state-bank lending in a province. It is also comparable to results by
Cole (2009), who finds that state banks increase agricultural lending by 5-10 percentage points
in an election year.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the presence of tactical reallocation over the full election cycle, which cov-
ers ten quarters before and after an election. It is clear from Panel A that targeted redistribution
starts at least four quarters before an election. It is strongest in two to three quarters prior to
an election, but it quickly disappears following an election. In both the metropolitan and full
samples, politically non-aligned provinces suffer from a relative reduction in lending by state
banks for multiple quarters in the run up to closely contested elections. Again, for constant
patronage argument, it is clear that βτ switches signs further away from elections (though not
always statistically significant) consistent with the view that without election concerns, central
government would favour its strongholds.
We believe that this visual representation of state-bank credit reallocation over the election
cycle provides strong evidence of political incentives behind state-bank lending. There could
be alternative explanations for why state banks in general would behave differently around
elections (e.g. flight to safety amongst depositors induced by political uncertainty). There could
also be reasons why certain provinces get a higher share of state-bank loans than others (e.g.
banks may specialise in lending to certain industries, which agglomerate in certain provinces).
However, without resorting to the argument of political incentives, it is very difficult to explain
why such cross-sectional relationships would vary in different directions based on local political
alignment and exactly prior to local elections.
In order to shed more light on political incentives, we explore the channels through which
the central government engages in tactical redistribution. Our aggregate credit data can be
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broken down by lending to different segments of the economy. This allows us to test whether
targeted lending occurs in certain segments but not others, which helps us understand what
voters respond to. On the one hand, politicians may try to induce a quick and direct impact
on voters by raising their instant consumption. Healy & Lenz (2014) find that voters judge
U.S. presidential candidates on the election-year economy because this is the most immediately
available metric to them for judging a president’s performance. However, given that province
mayors have no direct control over bank credit supply in Turkey which is widely known by the
public, it is difficult to argue that a change in consumer loans would have a direct impact on
consumers’ perception about the incumbent mayor.
On the other hand, politicians may be tempted to use bank credit to boost or contain corporate
activity in a region. This would be more likely to influence voting patters if corporates have a
say in local politics and voters – at least partly – attribute corporates’ economic outcomes to
local politicians. For instance, Carvalho (2014) finds evidence in line with this view and shows
that the central government in Brazil provides favourable credit to firms in aligned regions,
who in turn expand employment to increase the re-election chances of incumbents. Although
the consumer and corporate channels are not mutually exclusive, we expect the latter to be
dominant in the Turkish political setting given its similarity to that of Brazil.
Figure 4.7 plots quarterly estimates from Equation 4.2 separately for corporate and consumer
loans for different values of τ . A simple comparison between Panels A and B confirms our
expectation that tactical redistribution is mainly targeted at corporate loans. The coefficient
estimates are sizeable and statistically significant for both aligned and non-aligned provinces
in the case of corporate loans. On average, a one standard deviation change in competition
leads state banks to increase corporate loans by 9.8% in aligned municipalities and reduce it
by 15.7% in non-aligned ones in the election year when compared with private banks. The
positive impact in aligned provinces peaks precisely on the election quarter, while the negative
impact in non-aligned provinces hits the bottom two quarters prior to the election. There is
also statistical evidence that these patterns reverse in periods away from elections, supporting
the notion that government might be pursuing patronage in those quarters.
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In contrast, estimates for consumer loans are all insignificant and show no meaningful visible
pattern around elections. We therefore conclude that the central government’s reallocation of
state-bank credit targets firms’ credit access and aims to influence local economic and vot-
ing outcomes through the corporate channel. This leads us to investigate the effects of such
redistribution on economic activity in the next section.
4.4.4 How does political lending affect economic outcomes?
We have so far established that there is an election-induced cycle in state-bank loans, which
affects especially the corporate sector. Such lending is targeted at politically competitive
provinces based on their political alignment. In ruling-party constituencies, it takes the form
of rewarding the competitive region by increasing credit supply, and in opposition regions, it
takes the form of punishment by lowering state-bank lending. This gives us a quasi-exogenous
source of variation in the amount of total bank credit around local election times that provinces
receive depending on their alignment. We now ask whether this variation in credit translates
into real outcomes. If it does, then ‘swing’ provinces ruled by an opposition mayor are expected
to suffer from lower economic activity around elections compared with provinces governed by
a politically aligned mayor.
Since there is no data currently available on province-level GDP, we draw on a new dataset
that contains all construction permits issued over the sample period in Turkey as a proxy for
local economic activity. To abstract from the possibility that central government may directly
interfere in the construction industry via state-funded institutions,29 we only keep private sector
activity in our sample. Construction by private entities is likely to be a good proxy for overall
economic activity, since it tends to have a high correlation with an economy’s growth rate.
29See Marschall et al. (2016).
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Formally, we estimate the following model:
LogActivityp,t = βτOppositionp,t × Compp,t × Electiont+τ + α1Compp,t × Electiont+τ
+ α2Compp,t ×Oppositionp,t + α3Oppositionp,t × Electiont+τ
+ α4Compp,t + α5Oppositionp,t + δXb,p,t−1 + θb + γp + λt + εb,p,t (4.3)
where LogActivityp,t is computed in three different ways. First, Log Flats measures (in logs)
the total number of flats constructed by the private sector in province p in year t. Second, Log
SqMtr measures the total square meter area covered by new construction. Third, Log Value
measures the total monetary value of new construction. We use all three measures as alternative
dependent variables. In order to control for potential drivers of construction activity, we include
the lagged population size of each province over time (in logs). Oppositionp,t indicates whether a
province is governed by a mayor affiliated with an opposition party or not. The main coefficient
of interest is βτ , which measures the economic impact of being in an opposition province with
high political contestedness around election times compared with being in an aligned province.
If opposition regions suffer from a credit squeeze as we have shown previously, then one would
expect to find a negative impact on local economic activity as captured by βτ < 0 around
elections.30
Table 4.7 presents estimates of this regression for the election year (i.e., τ = 0). For all three of
our dependent variables and across varying sets of controls, the triple-interaction term carries
a significantly negative value. The estimated effects are economically substantial. Ceteris
paribus, a one standard deviation increase in electoral competition would decrease the number
of flats constructed in an opposition province by almost 10% in an election year. Given that
new construction activity accounts directly for around 8-9% of GDP in Turkey, only the effect
of credit on construction itself would translate into almost a 1% reduction in total economic
output.
To observe the full election cycle in local economic activity, Figure 4.8 plots estimates of βτ
30Since construction sector usually responds to local economic factors with a lag, we define Electiont dummy
according to ‘actual election’ years.
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for τ = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2. Panels A-C report results on Log Flats, Log SqMtr, and Log Value,
respectively. For all three measures of activity, there is a visible downward trend in opposition
areas with high political competition as elections get closer. In line with the persistence of the
lending cycle beyond elections documented earlier, we find that construction activity lags in
opposition provinces one year after elections take place. Hence, withdrawal of credit by state
banks in politically competitive provinces under an opposition mayor leads to a significant
distortion of economic activity.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we test for the presence of politically motivated distribution of resources in Turkey
using a dataset with detailed information on banking activity and local economic outcomes.
Our dataset is novel along several dimensions and helps us achieve stronger identification than
earlier studies, while shedding light on some of the theoretical arguments voiced in the literature.
Our main findings are two-fold. First, we show that state banks in Turkey engage in politically
motivated lending around local elections when compared with private banks. In particular, they
increase lending to the corporate sector in politically attractive provinces when an incumbent
mayor is aligned with the ruling party, while they reduce it if the incumbent mayor is from
an opposition party. Second, this redistribution of credit has real consequences. Specifically,
it leads to a significant reduction in local economic activity in opposition provinces that are
politically contested.
Our findings around elections support the idea of tactical redistribution. Rolling estimations in
non-election years show some evidence that central government may have resorted to patronage
when it did not have election concerns. In ongoing work, we ask whether reallocation of
bank credit helps the central government increase the electoral success of its allied mayoral
candidates. To the extent that it does, it may provide one of the first pieces of evidence on
how voters can be manipulated via financial intermediaries.
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(a) An allied province in 2004 elections
(b) A non-allied province in 2004 elections
Figure 4.1: District-level alliances in two non-metropolitan provinces. Panel A shows
a province in which the elected central district mayor is allied with the central government and
Panel B shows a province in which the elected central district mayor is non-allied. ‘C’ in red
colour stands for the central district. Allied districts are given in yellow and non-allied districts
are given in varying shades of grey corresponding to different opposition parties.
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of aggregate credit by bank type, 2003-2016. This figure shows
the evolution of the stock of all cash loans extended by state-owned and private banks during
the period 2003-2016.
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(a) Metropolitan provinces
(b) All provinces
Figure 4.3: State vs private bank behaviour over the full election cycle: Yearly
estimates (2003-2016). This figure shows results of Equation (4.1) estimated on yearly data
when τ takes values from -2 to +2, indicating the number of years around elections. Each
plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence
intervals. Each regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and
province time trends. Panel A includes metropolitan provinces and panel B includes the full
sample.
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(a) Metropolitan provinces
(b) All provinces
Figure 4.4: State vs private bank behaviour over the full election cycle: Quarterly
estimates (2007q4-2016q4). This figure shows results of Equation (4.1) estimated on quar-
terly data when τ takes values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters around
elections. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show
90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed
effects, and province time trends. Panel A includes metropolitan provinces and panel B includes
the full sample.
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(a) Metropolitan provinces
(b) All provinces
Figure 4.5: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the full election cycle:
Yearly estimates (2003-2016). This figure shows results of Equation (4.2) estimated on
yearly data when τ takes values from -2 to +2, indicating the number of years around elections.
Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confi-
dence intervals. Each regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of fixed effects, and
province time trends. Panel A includes metropolitan provinces and panel B includes the full
sample; estimates are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel.
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(a) Metropolitan provinces
(b) All provinces
Figure 4.6: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit over the full election cycle:
Quarterly estimates (2007q4-2016q4). This figure shows results of Equation (4.2) esti-
mated on quarterly data when τ takes values from -10 to +10, indicating the number of quarters
around elections. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars around estimates
show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local branches, our baseline set of
fixed effects, and province time trends. Panel A includes metropolitan provinces and panel B
includes the full sample; estimates are reported separately for aligned and non-aligned provinces
in each panel.
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(a) Corporate loans
(b) Consumer loans
Figure 4.7: Corporate vs consumer loans: Tactical redistribution of state-bank credit
over the full election cycle (2007q4-2016q4). This figure shows results of Equation (4.2)
estimated on quarterly data when τ takes values from -10 to +10, indicating the number
of quarters around elections. Each plotted coefficient comes from a single regression; bars
around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression controls for local branches,
our baseline set of fixed effects, and province time trends. Panel A shows estimates for corporate
loans and panel B shows estimates for consumer loans; estimates are reported separately for
aligned and non-aligned provinces in each panel.
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(a) Dependent variable: LogFlats
(b) Dependent variable: LogSqMtr
(c) Dependent variable: LogValue
Figure 4.8: Effect of competition and alliance on local economic activity (2003-2016).
This figure shows results of Equation (4.3) estimated on yearly data when τ takes values from
-2 to +2, indicating the number of years around elections. Each plotted coefficient comes
from a single regression; bars around estimates show 90% confidence intervals. Each regression
controls for our baseline set of fixed effects. Panel A shows estimates for the dependent variable
total number of flats, panel B shows estimates for total square meter area and panel C shows
estimates for total value in Turkish liras.
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Table 4.1: Composition and performance of Turkish banking sector over time. This
table summarizes the composition and financial performance of the banking sector in Turkey.
State banks are defined as banks in which the central government has a controlling stake.
Private banks are defined as all other banks. We exclude investment banks, development
banks, and participation banks. NPL denotes non-performing loans. ROA denotes Return on
Assets. Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT) & authors’ calculations.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this PhD thesis, I have investigated three topics on sovereign risk and banking.
In the first study (Chapter 2), we look at the sovereign contagion links during Eurozone crisis
and how they change in response to an exogenous ECB policy announcement in order to
differentiate between alternative theories in the literature. Our findings are: (i) principal
components analysis reveals that the perceived commonality in default risk among peripheral
and core Eurozone countries increased after the announcement. In the meantime, the link
between country fundamentals and spreads strengthened implying that there might be non-
fundamental factors at play prior to the announcement. (ii) An event study detects significant
pre-announcement news transmission from Spain to Italy, Belgium, France and Austria that
clearly dissipates post-announcement. This is consistent with the view that news in one country
could act as a trigger (sunspot) for self-fulfilling market movements against other countries. (iii)
Country-specific regressions of CDS spreads on systematic risk factors illustrate frequent days
of large adverse shocks affecting simultaneously those same Eurozone countries during the pre-
announcement period; but not afterwards. Altogether these findings support the view that
market expectations during Eurozone crisis were at least partially self-fulfilling and ECB policy
helped to contain such adverse dynamics.
Chapter 3 studies the relationship between sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone and European
banks’ government debt exposures. (i) I first re-confirm that the crisis led to the reallocation of
146
sovereign debt from foreign to domestic banks. (ii) However, this reallocation was only visible
for banks as opposed to other domestic private agents, which does not seem to be consistent
with the secondary market or exchange rate channel of the rising home bias. (iii) I find weak
evidence for risk-shifting tendency of the troubled country banks; nonetheless this does not
come close to explaining the full extent of the preference for local government bonds. (iv) In
contrast to the recent literature focusing only on sovereign debt, I also show that banks’ private
sector exposures were (at least) equally affected by a rise in home bias, which implies that the
specific channel of moral suasion on sovereign debt has limited explanatory power in sample.
Given the insufficiency of the existing explanations, I propose a new debt reallocation channel
based on informational frictions and (v) show that crisis-country debt was not only reallocated
to domestic banks, but also to the informationally closer foreign banks. I further confirm that
this effect is independent of the previous channels proposed in the literature, robust to various
sample recompositions and exists more generally rather than being specific to the periods of
extreme sovereign stress. Hence, these results imply that informational asymmetries among
banks played a key role in the recent fragmentation across Eurozone debt markets.
Lastly, in Chapter 4, we look at the political economy aspects of the relationship between
governments and banks. (i) We find that state-owned banks in Turkey systematically adjust
their provincial lending around local elections relative to the private banks in the same province.
There is considerable tactical redistribution: state-owned banks increase loans in politically
competitive provinces with a current mayor aligned with the ruling party but reduce it in
similar provinces with a current mayor from opposition. Besides, rolling estimations in non-
election years show some evidence that central government may have resorted to patronage
when it did not have election concerns. (ii) Political cycle only exists in corporate lending
as opposed to consumer loans, suggesting that tactical redistribution targets job creation to
increase electoral success. In line with this conjecture, real local outcomes seem to be influenced
by the political cycle as the credit-constrained opposition areas suffer a drop in economic output
measured by local construction activity.
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